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Government Litigation in the Supreme Court:
The Roles of the Solicitor General*
According to the original statutory authorization, "there shall be in
said Department [of Justice] an officer learned in the law, to assist the
Attorney-General in the performance of his duties, to be called the
solicitor-general . . . ."1 Congress also empowered the Solicitor General
to argue in the Attorney General's discretion "any case in which the
government is interested" in the Court of Claims or upon appeal from
that or any other court in the Supreme Court, and any case in which
the United States was interested in any federal or state court.2 Sub-
stantially the same statutory language describes the Solicitor General's
functions a century later.3
These spare provisions and the Office's small size 4 mask the actual
scope of the Solicitor General's powers and his critical role in shaping
the development of the law. Given the number and importance of
the Supreme Court cases in which the government is involved,5 the
Solicitor General is often called upon to argue before the Court, and
his skill in advocacy shapes precedent in vital areas of the law. That
possibility would exist for any lawyer with an active Supreme Court
* The research for this Note was made possible by a grant from the Walter E. Meyer
Research Institute of Law. The Journal wishes to express its thanks to the staffs of the
Office of the Solicitor General, the Yale Law Library, the Supreme Court Library, and
the Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court for their kind and helpful assistance. The
Journal also thanks Solicitor General Griswold, former Solicitor General Cox, and the
CAB, FCC, FPC, FTC, ICC, NLRB, and SEC for granting interviews.
1. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162.
2. Id., § 5, 16 Stat. 162-63. These provisions were codified five years later as Rev. Stat.
tit. VIII, §§ 347, 359, 367 (1875).
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 505, 517, 518 (Supp. III, 1965-67).
4. The Office has not significantly changed in size or structure in the last thirty-five
years. At the present time, there are eleven lawyers in the office, handling an estimated
seventeen cases a day.
The term Solicitor General as used in this Note refers not only to the individual,
but also to the entire Office.
5. The figures for the last five Supreme Court terms were:
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Cases on docket 2779 2662 3284 3356 3586
Cases in which the
government participated 910 1000 1116 1143 1274
Per cent of cases in which
government participated 33 38 34 34 36
Cases argued on the merits 144 122 131 150 179
Government participating 83 70 76 77 115
Percentage 58 57 58 51 64
Source: 1968 ATT'y GEN. ANN. REP,. 98, 102.
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practice; the Solicitor General's influence stems, however, not only
from his frequent appearances, but also from his other powers. In
cases involving the Justice Department, the Solicitor General controls
access to the circuit courts and to the Supreme Court." No unsuccess-
fully litigated Justice Department case may be disposed of internally
without his approval. 7 In cases involving the regulatory agencies,
except the Interstate Commerce Commission," the Solicitor General
grants or denies requests to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari.
In cases where the government is respondent, he decides whether to
contest or join an opposing party's petition. If the Solicitor General
believes that the government's position is legally untenable, he may
confess error, an action which is generally dispositive. In addition,
the Solicitor General is often involved in inter-agency disputes before
the Court. He also participates as amicus curiae on his own initiative
or upon the Court's request, frequently in cases of major constitutional
importance.9
The Solicitor General's relationship with the Court is multifaceted.
The Court relies upon his ability to limit the number and guarantee
the importance of the cases appealed by the government. It also de-
pends upon him to present the views of the Executive and often to
inform the Court, for example, as to the content of barely legible in
forma pauperis petitions. The Court also assumes that the Solicitor
General-as the lawyer for a special client, the United States-will
not only attempt to win a case, but will aid the Court in finding the
solution most conducive to the public interest.
As the bridge between the Executive and the Judiciary, the Solicitor
General must often choose betwen incongruous roles and differing
6. 1967 Ai-'y GEN. AN. REP. 15-16, 32-33.
7. 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.20, 0.163 (1969). The Solicitor General also controls agency litigation
which originates in the district courts on appeal to the circuit courts.
8. The statutory authorization for the ICC is 28 U.S.C. § 2323 (1964); as to its special
role, see Stem, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 Hnv. L. RP,'. 759, 760-64
(1951). The Federal Maritime Commission also appeals its own cases but this occurs an
average of only once in four years.
9. The literature on the Solicitor General's Office consists almost entirely of articles
'written by past Solicitors General. See Cox, The Government in the Supreme Court. 44
Cm. B. Racoiw 221 (1963); Fahy, The Office of the Solicitor General, 28 A.B.A.J. 20 (1942);
Perlman, The Work of the Office of the Solicitor General, 54 TRANxs. MD. ST. B. Ass', 265
(1948); Sobeloff, Attorney For the Government: the Work of the Solicitor General's Office,
41 A.B.A.J. 229 (1955); Sobeloff, The Law Business of the United States, 34 ORE. L RE%-.
145 (1955); Stem, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 HAV. L. Ra%. 759 (1951);
Stem, The Solicitor General's Office and Administrative Agency Litigation, 46 A.B.A.J.
154 (1960). See also Brigman, The Office of the Solicitor General (Ph.D. Dissertation. Uni-
versity of North Carolina, 1966); Krislov, The Role of the Attorney General as Amicus
Curiae, in THE RoLE OF THE ATroRNEY GENERAL OF T u UNrrED STATrEs 71-113 (1963);
'Werdegar, The Solicitor General and Administrative Due Process: A Quarter Century of
Advocacy, 36 Gao. IWASH. L. Rnv. 481 (1968).
1443
The Yale Law Journal
loyalties. He is still the government's lawyer, and he most frequently
acts as an advocate. On the other hand, he also functions as a reviewer
of government positions, an officer of the Court, and, as past Solici-
tors General have emphasized, a protector of the public interest. These
conflicting roles highlight the Office of the Solicitor General viewed
as an institution of government. This Note concentrates upon four of
the Solicitor General's functions which illustrate problems of conflict:
granting or denial of authorization to seek certiorari, participation in
interagency conflicts, intervention as amicus curiae, and confession of
error.10
An issue which underlies these conflicts is the degree of indepen-
dence which the Solicitor General enjoys. As an officer of the Depart-
ment of Justice and a member of the national administration, he lacks
complete freedom to choose cases or positions. The Office operates,
however, with an exceptional degree of autonomy within the Execu-
tive-a function of the stature of the men occupying the position, the
advantage to the government of maintaining an advocate whom the
Court can trust, and the Solicitor General's lack of involvement in the
often politically charged decision to initiate litigation.
The Solicitor General does consult the Attorney General to learn
the administration's position in politically sensitive cases. In rare
instances, the Attorney General might dictate the Solicitor General's
decision. The Solicitor General possesses, however, sufficient inde-
pendence to resist presenting to the Court an argument which he
finds disingenuous or unconscionable. In the great majority of cases,
the Attorney General is not involved and the Solicitor General op-
erates independently within the Justice Department.1
10. Since it poses less dramatic problems of conflict, the Solicitor General's most fre-
quent role, as the government's lawyer in the traditional adversary sense, Is not considered.
Other of the Solicitor General's roles are also not considered. Although he is responsible
for authorizing appeals by the Justice Department to the circuit courts, the appellate
sections of the justice Department assume the primary responsibility In that process, the
Solicitor General adopting their recommendations in 90% of the cases. The Solicitor
General does exercise a clear supervisory role, however, as evidenced by the 10% of the
cases in which he overruled the appellate section's recommendations. Brigman, The
Office of the Solicitor General 37 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1966).
The reported cases and briefs of the Solicitor General were examined over the period of
time, 1959-1969, covering the terms of four Solicitors General-Rankin, Cox, Marshall and
Griswold-as well as two changes of party in the White House.
11. Francis Biddle, Solicitor General from 1940-1941, commented that his position was
the ultimate professional satisfaction:
The work combines the best of private practice and of government service. He
determines what cases to appeal, and the client has no say in the matter, lie does
what his lawyer tells him, the lawyer stands in his client's shoes, for the client is but
an abstraction. He is responsible neither to the man who appointed him nor to his
immediate superior in the hierarchy of administration. The total responsibility Is
his, and his guide is only the ethic of his law profession framed In the ambience of
1444
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I. The Decision to Seek Certiorari
Although the Solicitor General's conduct of litigation once in the
Supreme Court is the most visible responsibility of the office, his pre-
liminary decision whether the government should petition the Su-
preme Court for certiorari, or acquiesce in or oppose the petitions
filed by others, is equally critical.12 The Solicitor General's imprimatur
carries considerable weight, as suggested by the fact that approximately
two thirds of the government's petitions for certiorari are granted. By
contrast, the Court grants only one-tenth of all petitions for certio-
rari.13 At the present time the power of the Solicitor General to regu-
his experience and judgment. And he represents the most powerful client in the world.
•.. The Solidtor General has no master to serve except his country.
F. BIDLE, IN BRI=F AuTmoirry 97 (1962).
See the comments of Justice Frankfurter in ROOSEvELT AND FRAx. 'Krtwrzn: TuEiR Co=r-
spoNDc, 1928-1945, at 743 (M. Freedman ed. 1967).
12. The Solicitor General also decides whether the government will appeal a decision
adverse to the government. The Solicitor General's decision to seek certiorari or appeal is
based on similar considerations, reflecting the Court's discretionary treatment of appealed
cases. See Douglas, The Supreme Court and its Case Load, 45 CoRN. L. Q. 401, 411 (960);
Gressman, Much Ado about Certiorari, 52 Gro. LJ. 742, 754 (1964).
Requests for certiorari are preliminarily reviewed by the appellate sections of the
Justice Department. The appellate sections of the Antitrust and Civil Divisions also
review recommendations from regulatory agencies seeking certiorari. The recommendation
of the appellate sections is then transferred to a member of the Solicitor General's staff,
along with the trial and appellate record, lower court opinion(s), and, where an agency is
involved, the agency's request. Each member of the Office has a field of specialization, and
his recommendation is reviewed by one of the three Deputy (called, until recently,
Assistant) Solicitors General and then by the Solicitor General himself.
13. The following figures cover the last five years for which statistics are available.
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Total petitions acted upon
by the Court 2048 2104 1929 2414 2549
Petitions filed or supported
by government 33 34 46 33 37
Petitions granted total 207 188 137 180 185
(10%) (9%) (7%) (7%) (70%)
Government petitions
granted 25 21 37 23 31
Percentage for government 76 62 80 70 84
Percentage for other
litigants 9 8 5 7 6
No. of cases considered by
the Solicitor General for
certiorari 444 385 385 360 367
No. of authorizations 39 43 36 32 40
No. of cases considered by
the Solicitor General for
courts of appeal 1212 1149 1103 1089 965
No. authorized 388 S08 268 208 195
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late access to the Court extends to cases brought by all executive
departments and the administrative agencies, with the exception of
the ICC. Control over agency petitions is the most controversial and
anomalous of the Solicitor General's functions. 14 The regulatory
agencies were intended to be relatively independent, responsible for
the impartial administration and development of a body of law. Their
orders were to be subject to review by the judiciary. The ability of
an executive official, directly responsible to the Attorney General and
the President, to exercise perhaps decisive control over the agencies'
litigation is arguably inconsistent with the agencies' design. In addi-
tion, his decision not to seek certiorari removes the determination of
"certworthiness" from the Court's hands.
A. History and Legislative Intent
The Solicitor General's position came into being seventeen years
before the first independent agency and twenty-one years before
Congress first established the discretionary writ of certiorari as a
means of access to the Court. Congress obviously did not originally
foresee the extent of the Solicitor General's present control. More
recently, Congress has been on notice of the extent of the Solicitor
General's powers, and with each agency it created could have indicated
its disapproval of his control.
The evolution of the Solicitor General's powers occurred as a result
of changes within the Justice Department and the creation of the
regulatory agencies. In 1870, as part of a post-Civil War economy drive
1967 Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 39; 1966 ATr'y GrN. ANN. REP. 55.
The Solicitor General's high percentage can also be argued as consistent, it should be
noted, with undue timidity in seeking certiorari in meritorious cases. See the comments of
Solicitor General Jackson in 1938 AT'y GEN. ANN. Rn'. 37 and Solicitor General Biddle in
1940 Air'y GEN. ANN. REP. 44.
Comparisons between the government's and private parties' figures should be tempered
by several considerations. A large number of private petitions are frivolous appeals of
criminal convictions. Furthermore, the filing of a petition by private parties incurs little
risk of judicial sanctions and leaves open the possibility of a reversal. By contrast, denial
of a government petition can have severe effects on other litigation; see pp. 1456-58 infra.
14. Unlike the Solicitor General's other functions, his ability to deny authorization to
seek certiorari prevents the Court or any other public forum from dealing with a case.
While agency independence is not complete-the Bureau of the Budget exercises control
over the agencies' budgetary and legislative requests and the President appoints agency
members-these deviations were either accepted by Congress or do not represent complete
outside control of an agency's activity. For example, an agency can request a Congressman
to introduce legislation or make known its budgetary desires. The Solicitor General's con.
trol is more pervasive and relates to an agency's actual policy formulations and litigation
activity. See Stern, The Solicitor General's Office and Administrative Agency Litigation,
46 A.B.A.J. 154, 155-56 (1960).
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to curb the cost of government litigation, the Justice Department,
including the Solicitor General, was created to replace expensive
outside counsel.15 The growing volume of government litigation and
the commensurate increase in the Attorney General's administrative
and political responsibilities in subsequent years caused a greater
division of labor within the Justice Department than the original
statute had contemplated, 16 and the Solicitor General became almost
solely responsible for the management of Supreme Court litigation.17
By 1895 Justice Department policy required the Solicitor General's
authorization in order to appeal to the Court a department case in-
volving Indian claims.' 8
The Solicitor General began to authorize Justice Department ap-
peals to the circuit courts after the First World War.'0 In 1933, he
was relieved of his responsibilities for the preparation of the Attorney
General's opinions and an Assistant Solicitor General was created to
assume that task.20 During the Second World War, the Solicitor Gen-
eral briefly assumed a number of other positions2' in his capacity as
15. The Government's business in the Supreme Court was originally handled by the
Attorney General. Judiciary Act of 1789 ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 93. He conunued in this role
until 1870, while practicing on the side. See H. B. LEARNED, THE Arror4NEv-GNErLAL A%D
THE CABINEr (1909); J. S. EASBY-S.irrH, THE DEPART.MENor OF JusTiCE; ITS I-IsTORy AND
FUNCT1IONS 1-14 (1904). The involvement of the Attorney General in private suits did not
end with the creation of the Justice Department; for a discussion of his role in litigating
private land claims, see United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 US. 273, 303-08 (1888).
and 1890 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. xvi, announcing the end of that practice. As for Con-
gress's purpose in the 1870 changes, see CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1271-73 (1863).
and S. Exec. Doc. No. 13, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1867).
The original goal of centralizing all of the responsibility for government litigation in
the Attorney General's hands has not, of course, been attained. See L M. SIomR-, THE
DEVELOP.mENr OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION IN TILE UNITED STATES 330-32.
34243 (1923), and the Hoover Commission Report, U.S. COM.M'N oN ORLGANIZATION OF TIlE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH, REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PRocEDuRE 7-17 (1955).
16. The original statute visualized the Solicitor General as primarily a courtroom
lawyer and the Attorney General's assistant. The rapid growth in the number of govern-
ment cases is suggested by the fact that in 1877 one thousand cases were on the Supreme
Court docket, resulting in a two to three year lag before cases were heard. The govern-
ment was involved in 175. 1877 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 11-13. In 1889, the Attorney General
was already far behind in his work and requested a second Assistant Attorne) General to
aid in the preparation of opinions and to allow more attention to be given to Supreme
Court cases. 1889 Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 8-9.
17. Thacher, Genesis and Present Duties of Office of Solicitor Genwral, 17 A.B.,.J.
519, 520-21 (1931).
18. 1895 ATr'v GEN. ANN. REP. 53.
19. See A. G. LANGELU'rIC, THE DEPART.IENTr Or JusTicE OF TIE UNITED STkrrs 35.36
(1927). The First World War also caused another spurt in the volume of cases, and the
Solicitor General's role within the Justice Department had become sufficiently critical to
justify his issuing an independent annual report. 1919 ATr'v G.. RP. 32-53.
20. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 101, § 16, 48 Stat. 307-08. See also S. Doc. No. 25. 73rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1933); Attorney General Cummings's Radio Address, The National
Government's Law Office, delivered July 16, 1937 (reprinted 1938). at 4-5. This function
is now performed by the Office of Legal Counsel.
21. He was first placed in charge of alien registration. 1940 Arr'v GE2N. ANN. REP. 49.
During the War, he was director of the Department's War Division, Chairman of the
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the number two man in the Justice Department. Creation of the
Deputy Attorney General's post in 1953 relieved the Solicitor General
of many of his adminstrative responsibilities. 22
The question of access to the Court by the independent agencies
has been subsumed in the larger continuing battle between the
Justice Department's conception of itself as lawyer for the entire gov-
ernment and the agencies' belief in the value of their independence.
The issue was originally joined in the 1910 battle over the proposal to
create a specialized Commerce Court to review ICC orders.20 One
strand of the controversy centered on the ICC's power to represent
itself on appeal. Some, including President Taft, felt that this was an
inappropriate function for a quasi-judicial body and a responsibility
better left to the Attorney General;2 4 others believed the ICC should
continue to represent itself on appeal because the ICC's lawyers were
more expert than Justice Department attorneys and because the At-
torney General might, perhaps for political reasons, shape the agency's
litigation.2 5
A compromise finally emerged: 26 the Attorney General would have
general charge and control of the litigation and the United States
would be the statutory defendant, but the ICC and other interested
parties could intervene of their own motion.27 The statute further
specified that the ICC could be represented by its own counsel, and,
most importantly, that a case could not be discontinued without the
ICC's consent. Two years later when Congress abolished the Com-
merce Court, it retained the provisions regarding the control of litiga-
Board of Legal Examiners, member of the Federal Board of Hospitalization, Chairman of
the Justice Department Committee on Deferments, and the Attorney General's alternate
on the Board of Economic Warfare. He was also placed on special assignments. 1943 A'r'Y
GEN. ANN. RE. 49. See also F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 106-49 (1962).
22. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1953, § 1, 67 Stat. 636.
23. See generally Tollefson, Judicial Review of the Decisions of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, 11 MINN. L. REv. 389, 504 (1927).
24. H.R. Rep. No. 923, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 8 (1910); S. Rep. No. 355, pt. 1, G1st
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1910).
25. "Thus the amazing spectacle would be constantly presented of a review of the
orders of the commission not by a court, but by the Department of Justice," S. Rep. No.
355, pt. 2, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1910). On the Senate floor, Senator Root, one of the
Commerce Court's chief supporters, sought to quiet these fears by stating that the Attor-
ney General's role would only be ministerial: "It is his business to defend. He Is no
judge; he is no legislator; he is no reviewing authority." 45 CONG. REc. 4104 (1910). The
differing versions in the House and Senate appear in S. Doc. No. 606, 61st Cong., 2d1 Sess.
8-10 (1910).
26. This was still objectionable to a minority in the House-Senate conference who
feared the Attorney General's political decision-making and the Justice Department's
lack of expertise. S. Doc. No. 623, pt. 2, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1910).
27. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 212, 36 Stat. 1150.
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tion28 and provided that orders would be reviewed by three judge
district courts and from there by appeal to the Supreme Court. No
other agency has ever been granted the right to pursue its own litiga-
tion in such specific terms.
29
With the creation of the FTC in 1914,30 Congress first established
the now prevalent pattern of judicial review of agency orders-from
the agency to the circuit courts to the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari.31 The switch from the ICC's procedure and from appeal to
certiorari was made primarily because it was felt that using the rela-
tively new circuit courts would speed review.32 Congress did not,
however, incorporate the various provisions regarding representation
into the Federal Trade Commission Act; in particular, the FTC was
not given the right to continue a suit. The Act provided that the deci-
sion of the circuit court would be final except for review by the Supreme
Court by certiorari,33 but did not specify which governmental body
would decide to file the petition. There was no congressional statement
as to whether the FTC's Supreme Court litigation should be funneled
through the Justice Department.34 Congress continued to use the FTC
model for every new regulatory agency it established, with the excep-
tion of certain matters within the jurisdiction of the FCC,," the Mari-
28. Act of October 22, 1913 (Urgent Deficiencies Act) ch. 32, 38 Stat. 219-21. In 1922
Congress also authorized the creation of an Assistant to the Solicitor General to help
enforce the ICC's statute. Act of June 1, 1922, ch. 204, 42 Stat. 613-14.
29. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321-25 (1964).
g0. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717.
31. Id. § 5, 38 Stat. at 720.
32. H. R. Rep. No. 1142 (Conference Report) 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914); 51 CoNG.
Rac. 14,768, 14,770, 14,925-27 (1914).
33. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 720, now 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
34. In other aspects of the FTC's litigation, Congress was not specific either. Subpoenas
have posed a difficult problem of statutory interpretation; see FTC v. Guignon, 390 F.2d
323 (8th Cir. 1968). A writ of mandamus does require the Attorney Genera's consent.
FTC Act, § 9, 38 Stat. 722, now 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1964).
It is arguable, though hardly dispositive, that given the fact that Congress's motive for
creating the FTC was to supplement what it believed to be the Attorney General's lax
enforcement of the antitrust laws, Congress really did not intend to authorize any Justice
Department control over the FTC's litigation. Cf. 51 CoNG. Rrc. 12,031, 12,623, 12.624-25.
12,647-48 (1914).
35. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 402(a), 48 Stat. 1093, provides that FCC orders.
except those relating to construction permits or station licenses, shall be reviewed in
accordance with the ICC's procedure, and first heard in the district court. The commission
itself is a party and there is no mention of independent standing. The commission, unlike
the ICC, was not given the right to continue a suit without the Attorney General's consent.
Section 402(b) states that other orders are appealed to the District of Columbia circuit court
and from there, according to § 402(e), to the Supreme Court on certiorari. 48 Stat. 1093-94.
Section 402(a) was amended by the Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, § 14, 65 Stat. 718-20, to
conform to the Hobbs Act, discussed at pp. 1450-51 infra.
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time Commission, and the Secretary of Agriculture, 7 whose orders
were reviewed in three judge district courts.
Despite twenty years of additional experience, Congress did not
consider the problem of legal representation in the Court during the
New Deal. As the NLRB legislative history illustrates,38 most of the
statutes consciously imitated the Federal Trade Commission Act and
left open the issue of control over the filing of petitions. Congress's
failure during this period to deal with the question is also suggested
by the apparently haphazard collection of statutory provisions regard-
ing agency counsel. 3
9
In 1947 the Judicial Conference of the United States proposed the
total elimination of the three judge district court procedure of review
in favor of the FTC model. Hearings were held in the Eightieth and
Eighty-First Congresses, 40 and an extended battle began between the
ICC and the Attorney General. The other agencies affected by the
bill-the FCC, the FMC, and the Secretary of Agriculture-were less
opposed to change. 41 The bills, as drafted and adopted, provided
that the United States would remain as the statutory defendant with
the Attorney General in charge of the government's interests. The
three agencies, however, could intervene as of right, continue the suit
36. Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 452, § 31, 39 Stat. 738; Intercoastal Shipping Act of 1933,
ch. 199, § 5, 47 Stat. 1427.
37. Perishable Commodities Act of 1930, ch. 436, § 11, 46 Stat. 535; Packers and Stock.
yards Act of 1921, ch. 64, § 316, 42 Stat. 168.
38. The NLRB under the NRA had been crippled, in part because the court proceed.
ings were brought by Justice Department lawyers who had no knowledge of what the
Board had previously done in a case. As a result, the new Board was allowed to go to
court itself though no specific mention was made of Supreme Court representation. Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 4(a), 49 Stat. 451, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 154(a)
(1964) provides " * Attorneys appointed under this section may, at the direction of
the Board, appear for and represent the Board in any case in court." Appeals to the
Supreme Court are described in the ambiguous language of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, id., §§ 10(e), (f), 49 Stat. 454, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1964).
On the deliberate imitation of the FTC, see S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15
(1935); H. R. Rep. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6, 21 (1935); H. R. Rep. No. 1371 (Con-
fcrence Report), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1935); H. R. J. Res. No. 375, 48 Stat. 1183, 78
CONG. RFc. 11,635, 12,016 (1934).
39. The FTC statute is faithfully followed in the Securities & Exchange Act of 1933,
ch. 38, § 9(a), 48 Stat. 80-81, now 15 U.S.C. § 771(a) (1964); and the Bituminous Coal Com-
mission statute, Act of April 26, 1937, ch. 127, § 6(b), 50 Stat. 85. But the CAB provision
was inexplicably different. Act of June 23, 1938, ch. 601, §§ 1007(b), 1008, 52 Stat. 1025.
40. The bills are printed in Hearings on H.R. 1468, H.R. 1470, and H.R. 2271 of the
Eightieth Congress before Subcomm. No. 3 and No. 4 and on H.R. 2915 and HJl 2916
before Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2
(1949) [hereinafter cited as 1947-49 Hearings]. The relevant parts are H.R. 1468, §§ 8, 10,
at id., 23-24; and H.R. 1470, §§ 8, 10, at id., 25-26. The legislative history is summarized in
the committee reports. H.R. Rep. No. 1619, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1948).
41. 1947-1949 Hearings at 51-53 (Agriculture), 71-76 (testimony of FCC Assistant Gen-
eral Counsel), 93 (letters from Secretary of Agriculture & FCC). The FMC was hostile to
control by the Solicitor General. Id. at 144-47 (letter from FMC Chairman). Even the FCC
was perturbed by the Justice Department's amendments, discussed in note 42 infra. Id. at
138-43.
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irrespective of the Attorney General's action, 42 and file for certiorari. 43
The ICC alone was exempted from the new legislation-the Hobbs
Act 44-and retained its old procedure. 45
By providing that the affected agencies as well as the United States
could petition for certiorari, Congress added a degree of specificity
to the Hobbs Act which did not appear in the previous statutes
modeled after the FTC's. In point of fact, however, there has been no
difference in the relationship of the FCC, for example, and the NLRB
with the Solicitor General despite the differing statutory language; 4
both agencies clear their requests for petitions through him. On occa-
sion agencies have threatened to petition the Court without any
authorization, but none has ever done so.47 At least one agency has
sought to acquire by legislation the same degree of control over its
own litigation as the ICC possesses, 48 though many agencies feel that
the disadvantages of such a change might outweigh any gains.
42. Attorney General Clark and Solicitor General Perlman offered two amendments:
one requiring that all briefs be filed by either the Attorney General or the Solicitor Gen-
eral who would be in charge of the litigation, and the other allowing an agency separate
representation when the United States was a party. Id. at 127-28. Neither was incorporated
into the bill or mentioned in the committee reports-S. Rep. No. 2618, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950), and H.R. Rep. No. 2122, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
43. H.R. 2915, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 8, 10, 1947-49 Hearings, at 105-06; H.R. 2916,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 8, 10, id., at 108-09.
44. Act of December 29, 1950, ch. 1189, 64 Stat. 1129, as amended, 28 U-S.C. §§ 2341-50
(Supp. Ill, 1965-67).
45. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321-25 (1964).
46. The FMC appeals, however, its own infrequent Supreme Court cases.
47. The FMC tried to file a brief opposing a petition for certiorari prior to the Hobbs
Act, but it was sent by the Clerk of the Supreme Court to the Solicitor General for clear-
ance. 1947-1949 Hearings, at 146.
48. For the last eleven years, the CAB has introduced legislation which would give it
complete autonomy in the conduct of its litigation. Hearings were held nine years ago but
no action has been taken. S. 957, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), is an example of the CAB's
legislative idea. See also Hearings on S. 576, S. 1542, S. 1544, S. 1545, and S. 1547 before
the Aviation Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). The CAB has no independent standing in litigation and desires
complete autonomy, arguing that its differences with the Justice Department are over
policy and that Justice has consequently failed to provide adequate representation. Id. at
26, 31-32. The ICC has reversed its position and sought to come under what is in effect
the Hobbs Act; its proposed legislation passed the Senate but was not acted upon by the
House in the last Congress. S. 2687, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), see S. Rep. No. 1499, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). See also the proposal in Report of the Special Subcommittee on
Legislative Oversight of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H. R.
2711, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1959).
H. R. 12893, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), introduced this summer and referred to the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, is designed, as its title proclaims, "to
restore the independence of the Federal regulatory agencies." Section 31 amends 28 U.S.C.
§ 518(a) (Supp. I1, 1965-67), as follows:
Except when the Attorney General in a particular case directs othenise and except
when an independent regulatory agency otherwise requests with respect to its repre.
sentation in any proceeding to which it is a party, the Attorney General and the
Solicitor General shall conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court
(proposed changes in italics.)
Though 28 U.S.C. § 519 (Supp. III, 1965-67), which grants the Attorney General super.
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The legislative history, in sum, indicates that Congress's treatment
of the problem of representation in the Supreme Court has been char-
acterized largely by oversight, and the Solicitor General has assumed
his powers by default.
49
The Solicitor General has not, however, completely controlled the
agencies. He may petition for certiorari or present an argument which
he believes the Court will reject, simply to preserve amicable relations
with a regulatory agency or an executive department. Occasionally he
has authorized, but refused to join, the petition of an insistent
agency,50 and in rare instances has joined in an agency's petition be-
cause of the importance of the issue but declined to support the agency
on the merits.51
The statutory uncertainty has never been resolved by a confronta-
tion between the Solicitor General and an independent agency. The
Solicitor General is reluctant to force a showdown. The problem is
said to be an internal government matter from which the Solicitor
General has the duty to shield the Court. Moreover, if the Court ever
faced the question and resolved it in favor of the independent agen-
cies, the prestige and power of the Solicitor General would be severely
impaired.52 Even if the Court refused to face the issue squarely, but
visory power over all government litigation, is left intact, the above quoted section, though
it is subject to a narrow interpretation, seems directed toward eliminating the Solicitor
General's control over petitions for certiorari as well as the question of who will argue a
case before the Court.
The bill also provides in sections 32-35, that the affected agencies (CAB, FCC, FPC,
FTC, ICC, and SEC) may have lawyers represent them "in any case in court," the same
language as the NLRB's statute's. See note 38 supra. By contrast, the ICC's present statute
permits intervention as of right with its own counsel and states that the Attorney General
cannot dispose of an action without the ICC's consent. 28 US.C. § 2328 (1964).
49. The Solicitor General bases his power on 28 U.S.C. §§ 516 and 519 (Supp. III,
1965-67). Section 516 reads:
Except as is otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the
United States, an agency, or an officer thereof is a party, or Is interested, and securing
evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice under the direc-
tion of the Attorney General. (emphasis added)
50. See, e.g., FTC Brief for Certiorari, Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 801 F.2d
499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 869 U.S. 888 (1962); SG Brief for Certiorari at 16,
American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 877 US. 954 (1964)
(Solicitor General filed petition with notation that he would not support the FTC's posi-
tion if certiorari were granted).
51. See, e.g., SG Brief for Certiorari 16, American Oil Co. v. FTC, 377 US. 954 (1964.
52. Aside from seizing on the ambiguities in statutory language, FTC v. Dean Foods
Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966), laid down a doctrine that would give the agencies a persuasive
argument. The Seventh Circuit had held that the Commission, lacking specific statutory
authority, could not petition a court of appeals for a preliminary injunction to enjoin a
merger that was under investigation. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court on the
grounds that agency standing may be inferred if consistent with the exercise of the
agency's function:
There is no explicit statutory authority for the Commission to appear In judicial
review proceedings, but no one has contended it cannot appear in the courts of appeal
to defend its order. Nor has it ever been asserted that the Commission could not
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merely granted certiorari as requested by the agency, the precedent
would be damaging.
The independent agencies are similarly reluctant. Most anticipate
that the Supreme Court would merely deny certiorari, and the fruit-
less effort would damage the continuing relationship between the
agency and the Solicitor General. Furthermore, many independent
agencies are satisfied with the status quo, since they recognize that
the Solicitor General's endorsement of a petition or his support on
the merits increases the likelihood of a favorable Supreme Court
reaction.
In any event, an agency whose request for authorization has been
denied can attempt to evade the Solicitor General's veto by trying
the same argument in another case before a different circuit court. If
the agency wins, the opposing party will file the petition for certiorari
and, given a conflict among the circuits, certiorari is more likely to be
granted. One agency confessed that it often attempts to persuade
private parties to intervene so that, even if the agency loses in the
circuit court, a petition can be filed without the Solicitor General's
supervision.
B. Current Practice
Since 1925 the Supreme Court's selection of cases to be heard on the
merits has been left almost entirely to the Court's discretion5 3 and the
Court has increasingly attempted to limit its docket.54 As the number
of cases coming up for review has mushroomed in recent years,5 ' the
Solicitor General's role in the process of certiorari has aided the Su-
bring contempt actions in the appropriate court of appeals when the court's enforce-
ment orders were violated, though it has no statutory authority in this respect. Such
ancillary powers have always been treated as essential to the effective discharge of the
Commission's responsibilities.
,984 US. at 607. Contrast, however, the vigorous dissent written by Justice Fortas, joined
by Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White, 384 US. at 612.
53. Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
54. When the Office of the Solicitor General originated in 1870, Supreme Court reliew
was a matter of right, and a heavy stream of petty litigation continued to overburden the
Court. Although attempts were made in 1891 and 1916 to restrict access to the Court by
expanding the Court's discretionary jurisdiction, by 1925 the Court's docket was swamped.
The Judiciary Act of 1925, enacted at the urging of the Justices, reduced the Court's
obligatory jurisdiction from eighty per cent to ten per cent. It took the Court almost two
years between docketing and oral argument in 1925, compared with the approximately
six months that it now requires. See Douglas, supra note 12, at 403; Gressman, supra
note 12, at 748; Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts (speech before the ABA, Sept. 7,
1949), 69 Ct. v (1949).
55. There were 1238 cases docketed during the 1948 Supreme Court Term, 1657
docketed during the 1957 Term, and 3133 docketed during the 1967 Term. 1963 A-Tr'y
GEN. ANN. REP. 98; 1959 Arr'y GssN. ANN. RE:P. 38.
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preme Court in maintaining its broad discretionary review over an
extensive range of litigation. Most importantly he performs a filtering
function. The government as respondent participates in approximately
one third of all cases docketed each term,50 and an even higher per-
centage of cases argued on the merits. 7 To limit the number of
cases brought by the government, the Solicitor General, during the
1966 term, for example, authorized petitions for certiorari in only 40
of the 367 cases which the government lost below.';
A better conception of this screening process emerges from an
examination of the percentage of cases in which the Solicitor General
authorized the various government bodies to seek review by the Su-
preme Court. A statistical study found that the Solicitor General au-
thorized less than twenty per cent of the certiorari petitions requested
by executive departments; less than sixty per cent of those requested
by the appellate sections of the Justice Department; and less than
sixty-five per cent of those requested by the regulatory agencies.0
The standards which the Solicitor General applies in this filtering
process reflect the vague criteria suggested by the Supreme Court.
Rule 19 of the Supreme Court Rules 0 sets out several categories of
56. See figures cited in note 5 supra.
57. The government participated in 53% of the cases argued on the merits during the
1967 Term as petitioner or appellant or respondent or appellee. Percentages for the
1963-1966 Terms are 38%, 44%, 50% and 45%. 1968 ATr'y GEN. REP. 102.
58. See note 13 supra.
59. Brigman, supra note 9, at 75, 77, 120. These figures correspond to the estimates
suggested in interviews.
A statistical compilation prepared for the authors by the FTC indicated that the
Solicitor General had granted 17 of the 33 requests for certiorari that the FTC had made
between 1962 and 1969. The Court granted 14 of the 17 petitions approved by the
Solicitor General, and rendered a decision favorable to the agency in all cases heard on
the merits.
By way of contrast, during the same period 57 petitions for certiorari were filed by
private parties with the FTC as respondent. Only 2 of the 57 petitions were granted.
60. Rule 19 states:
1. A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only where there are special and important
reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) Where a state court has decided a federal question of substance not theretofore
determined by this court, or has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with applicable decisions of this court.
(b) Where a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision
of another court of appeals on the same matter; or has decided an Important
state or territorial question in a way in conflict with applicable state or terri-
torial law; or has decided an important question of federal law which has
not been, but should be, settled by this court; or has decided a federal
question in a way in conflict with applicable decisions of this court; or has
so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings,
or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an
exercise of this court's power of supervision.
2. The same general considerations outlined above will control in respect of peti-
tions for writs of certiorari to review judgments of the Court of Claims, of the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, or of any other court whose determina.
tions are by law reviewable on writ of certiorari.
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cases where review is possible, but the only operative words--"special
and important reasons"-are utterly devoid of any predictive or ana-
lytical content.61 In its opinions the Court has been equally imprecise,
limiting its explanation for granting certiorari to recitals of "the
importance of the question presented.102
Unlike many private parties who seek in their petitions for cer-
tiorari to persuade the Court on the merits of their case, the Solicitor
General's briefs focus on the policy reasons for review. He is reluc-
tant to seek certiorari in cases where there is no conflict among the
circuits or little likelihood that the question will recur.03 He rarely
files petitions in cases where the issue is essentially factual, e.g., when
an agency is reversed by a court of appeals for lack of substantial evi-
dence."s Moreover, in his evaluation of a case's "importance," the
61. Harper & Pratt have caustically remarked of these criteria:
Mhis rule is not very helpful; in fact it is practically useless to the lawyer tr)ing
to evaluate his chances of getting his case before the Court or trying to understand
why he failed in the attempt. The Court has succeeded in cloaking its certiorari
behavior in such a shroud of mystery that any explanation of what happens is the
sheerest guesswork.
Harper & Pratt, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do during the 1951 Term, 101
U. PA. L. REv. 439, 440 (1953).
62. See, e.g., Protective Comm. v. Anderson 390 U.S. 414, 418 (1968); Hardin v. Ken.
tucky Utilities Co., 390 US. 1, 5 (1968); Lassen v. Arizona Highway Dept., 385 U.S. 458.
461 (1967).
The Court may also label a case with one of the other criteria of Rule 19. Conflicts
among circuits are frequently mentioned. See, eg., Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service, 392 U.S. 206, 208 (1968); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 267,
372 (1968); Northeastern Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 US.
213, 217 (1967); Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. Bhd. of Railroad Trainmen, 387 US.
556, 558 (1967). At one time it was thought that a dear conflict would automatically
warrant certiorari, but this is not the case now. See The Monrosa '. Carbon Black Export,
Inc., 359 US. 180 (1959); Stem, Denial of Certiorari despite a Conflict, 66 HAl'. - Ray.
465 (1953).
The Court's failure to explain its grounds for denying certiorari have subjected it to
severe criticism. See Harper & Fowler, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1919
Term-An Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. PA. L. Rm,. 293 (1950); Henkin. Foreword:
On Drawing Lines, 82 HAv. L. REv. 63, 91 (1968). But see Justice Frankfurter's dis-
cussion in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
63. The Solicitor General's criteria for filing certiorari petitions were obtained from
interviews with the staff of the Office, and by an analysis of correspondence between the
Solicitor General and an independent agency in more titan a dozen cases where the
agency's requests for authorization were denied. The correspondence covered a period of
five years involving the tenures of three Solicitors General. See also Brigman, supra
note 9, at 67-89; 1938 Arr'y GaN. ANN. Rat'. 35-36.
64. By contrast, such evidentiary issues form a large number of the petitions from
private litigants. See Note, The Court, The Bar, and Certiorari at October Term, 1938,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 1160, 1186 (1958).
The Court also depends on the Solicitor General for a concise and impartial
statement of the facts and legal issues of a case. The brief amount of time the Court
can devote to each petition increases this reliance. Chief Justice Hughes once estimated
that an average of three minutes of discussion was spent in conference for each peti-
tion; the Court even then consumes an enormous amount of time in the certiorari
procedure. McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted b Chief Justice
Hughes, 63 H Av. L. Ry. 5, 14 (1948). Justice Frankfurter further noted that "the initial
decision to grant a petition for certiorari must necessarily be based on a limited apprecia-
tion of the issue in a case, resting as it so largely does on the partisan claims in briefs of
counsel." Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 US. 500. 527 (1957).
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Solicitor General makes a judgment both on the factual and legal
merits. He must decide which arguments he will present to the Court
if he feels certiorari should be sought, and his continuing relationship
with the Court dictates that he avoid presenting disingenuous argu-
ments or legal positions that he finds insupportable. For example, one
Solicitor General, in denying an agency's request that he seek certiorari,
stated that although the case possessed sufficient national importance to
merit certiorari, he found the lower court's opinion highly persuasive.
He explained to the agency:
It is . . . in the long range interests of the government that the
Supreme Court should be able to put confidence in the Solicitor
General's exercising some independent judgment about the repre-
sentations which he makes to the Court .... I could not in good
conscience sign a petition for certiorari either expressly or im-
pliedly representing that the court below had wrongly decided
an important question of federal law.",
The amount and variety of government litigation are sufficiently great
to permit the Solicitor General's selection of test cases to expand,
contract, or clarify Supreme Court precedents. Strategic considerations
of ripeness and the nature of the Court's docket also play a part in the
choice of cases to be appealed.66
The agencies benefit from the Solicitor General's advice since, for
them, far more than for private parties, denial of certiorari presents
real hazards for their other litigation. Although the Supreme Court
has repeatedly stated that a denial of certiorari indicates no opinion
of the merits, lawyers and judges attach significance to the Court's
action. 67 Federal courts, even if they deduce no Supreme Court view
on the merits, can at least predict that there is less risk of a reversal
if they adopt the position of the court whose opinion the Court
65. Correspondence between a Solicitor General and an agency.
66. Cf. P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 145-70 (1961).
67. For the Court's view, see, e.g., Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 838 U.S. 912
(1950); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Powe, 283 U.S. 401, 402-04 (1931).
"The Teal meaning of a denial of certiorari is not what the justices say it is. It is to be
found in the reactions of the public, the bar, and especially the judiciary." Harper &
Pratt, supra note 61, at 445. See, e.g., United States v. Camara, 271 F.2d 787, 789
(7th Cir. 1959); Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 221
F.2d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1955); Maclnnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157, 161 n.3 (9th Cir.
1951); Chas. Pfizer & Co. v. Laboratori Pro-Ter Prodotti Therapeutici, 278 F. Supp. 148,
154 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); and Berger v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 795, 796-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1959). See also Harper & Etherington, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the
1950 Term, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 354, 355 n.6 (1951); Note, The Court, the Bar, and
Certiorari at October Term 1958, 108 U. PA. L. Rav. 1160, 1204 (1958).
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failed to review. This view is bolstered by the fact that the majority
of cases in which certiorari is granted are reversed.""
The Solicitor General has, on occasion, advised an agency that its
chances of winning similar cases in other circuits would be diminished
by a denial of certiorari. The Solicitor General, because of his more
intimate knowledge of the Court, can also counsel agencies on proper
strategies for having a petition granted. The Solicitor General may
decide, for example, not to authorize a petition because a case's factual
situation raises the risk of not merely an affirmance of the lower
court's adverse judgment, thus making a circuitwide rule national,
but also of a harsher opinion. Conversely, where the Solicitor General
estimates that an agency might prevail in a different factual setting in
another circuit, he will so advise. If he is right, the resultant conflict
among the circuits increases the likelihood of Supreme Court review.
C. Conclusion
The Solicitor General's power to deny authorization to petition
for certiorari raises fundamental questions concerning his relation-
ship to the regulatory agencies. His power over the agencies' litigation
substitutes executive for judicial review, while his power to deny
certiorari entails foreclosure of the Court's own examination. Against
these concerns several considerations must be balanced. The Court
needs guidance in its selection of cases, and removal of the Solicitor
General's screening might create a danger of overloading the Court's
docket. Furthermore, the government must establish priorities among
its cases and avoid taking inconsistent positions in successive cases.
The effect of a more open avenue to the Court cannot be accurately
assessed. As might be expected, the Solicitor General's Office and the
agencies' staffs predict differing results. Members of the Office of the
Solicitor General and the agencies' general counsels do agree, however,
that thirty years of experience have taught the agencies to internalize
the Solicitor General's standards for authorizing certiorari. Written
memoranda to the agencies explaining his reasons for denying au-
thorization and constant meetings with general counsel when contro-
versy does develop have increased the agencies' sensitivity to the
problems of the Court.
68. Harper & Pratt, supra note 61, at 446. A study by students at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School of cases from 1948 to 1958 revealed that of all cases in which
certiorari was granted approximately two-thirds were reversed. Note, The Court, the Bar,
and Certiorari at October Term, 1958, 108 U. PA. I. LRv. 1160, 1178 n.18-1 (1958).
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The advisability of preserving the Solicitor General in some filtering
capacity stems from the need to avoid overburdening the Court
" and
from the advantages to the government that selectivity brings. The
elimination of the Solicitor General's control would probably produce
only a small percentage increase in the number of petitions filed each
term, but this increment does not accurately reflect the additional time
the Court would consume in disposing of these government cases."
'
Without guidance from the Solicitor General and knowledge of the
range of agency activities, the Court may, moreover, find selection of
the most important government cases difficult, and petitions for cases
of genuine importance might frequently be denied. The number of
cases decided on the merits each term has remained fairly constant,
and thus the government must establish priorities among the cases
eligible for plenary review3 1 Without a centralized decision-maker,
that would probably be impossible. The real question, therefore, is
how the power to set priorities should be allocated between the Solici-
tor General and the agencies.
There is an ambiguity in the Solicitor General's refusal to approve
an agency's request for certiorari. It can reflect his belief that a case is
of little or no precedential value, that the issue involved is unusual,
that the decision below was correct on the merits, or that the policy
that the agency is advancing in its litigation is wrong. If the basis of
the Solicitor General's decision is founded on policy differences, the
agency should be able to appeal on its own, since the Solicitor General
is no longer protecting the Court from cases clearly unworthy of its
consideration.72 The problem is that the grounds for disagreement may
69. Professor Henry Hart argued persuasively that the pressure of the Court's
calendar has materially affected the quality of its decisions. Foreword: The Time Chart
of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARy. L. Ray. 84 (1959). On the
other hand, Justice Douglas remarked that the Court has fewer oral arguments, fewer
opinions to write, and shorter work-weeks than they once had. The Supreme Court and
Its Case Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401 (1960). See also P. FREUND, Tim SuPREe COURT or
THE UNITED STATES 183 (1961); Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts (Speech before the
ABA, Sept. 7, 1949), 65 S. Ct. v, vi (1949); Gressman, Much Ado About Certiorari. 5.1
GEO. L. J. 742 (1964); Harlan, Manning the Dikes, RECORD OF N.Y.C.B. Ass'N 541, 547
(1958); cf. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 746 n.9 (1948) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
70. If the number of government petitions doubled, the increment would represent less
than a 2% increase in the petitions now filed annually. Most of the cases appealed to the
Court are clearly unworthy of plenary review and are speedily rejected. Harlan, supra
note 69. The government's cases usually involve issues of some public importance, and
the Court probably devotes considerably more time to a government petition.
71. The number of cases accepted for plenary review has remained fairly constant
over four decades. In the 1938 Supreme Court Term there were 186 cases argued on the
merits, compared with 161 in 1948, 154 in 1958, and 179 in 1967. 1968 AT'r'v GEN. ANN.
Rr. 102; 1959 AI-r'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 42; 1941 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 50. See Douglas,
supra note 12, at 405-10; Gressman, supra note 12, at 750-55.
72. Robert L. Stem, Acting Solicitor General 1952-54, expressed doubts about the
feasibility of dividing the cases on this basis. See Stern, supra note 14, at 217-18.
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be difficult to isolate, and placing the power to decide the cause of the
conflict in either the Solicitor General's or the agencies' hands may
leave the other without leverage.
Allowing an agency to petition for certiorari in case of substantial
disagreement, irrespective of its nature, poses the same problems and
may open the door to complete agency autonomy.73 Furthermore, this
solution would place a premium, from the agencies' point of view, on
conflict rather than compromise and settlement.
A policy statement by the Solicitor General as to the standards he
employs could serve as a starting point for discussion within the gov-
ernment. The Solicitor General should experiment in allowing agen-
cies freer access to the Court when, for example, their disagreement
with him stems from a policy dispute so stated in their petition. With
some information as to the effect of this change on the Court's work-
load and the government's appellate litigation, the proper balance
could be discovered as a result of conscious choice rather than acci-
dent.
II. Intragovernmental Conflicts
The Solicitor General considers it his responsibility to present a
unified government position to the Court. Though settlement of in-
tragovernmental differences is not always possible, the Solicitor Gen-
eral is most successful in resolving disputes among the divisions of the
Justice Department and among the executive departments. Conse-
quently, the disputes which reach the Court generally involve inde-
pendent agenciesJ 4
73. See, e.g., FTC v. Guignon, 390 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1968), in which the FTC asserted
independent authority to seek district court orders enforcing subpoenas which it had
issued. The Department of Justice claimed exclusive prerogative to seek enforcement of
independent agency subpoenas, and the Attorney General submitted an amicus brief to
that effect in the circuit court. The case was essentially an internal housekeeping dis-
pute involving no substantive policy considerations. The FTC, however, inflated the
issue, contending that the very independence of the agency and certainly its operational
efficiency were at stake. The FTC lost in the circuit court of appeals, and the Solicitor
General denied its request for independent authority to petition for certiorari on the
grounds that the issue was not of sufficient general importance to warrant Supreme
Court review. (The FTC assumed that the Solicitor General would not be able to sup-
port them on the merits in light of the Attorney General's public position.)
74. For two examples of rare intradepartmental conflicts, see SG's Brief 37-43,
Sullivan v. United States, 395 US. 169 (1969), and SG's Brief, Tellier v. Comm'r., 383
U.S. 687 (1966). Instead of referring to Brief for the United States, footnotes refer to
SG's Brief whenever the Solicitor General signed the document. Other abbreviations
include:




The Yale Law Journal
An overt conflict may develop because an agency's or department's
decision affecting one economic interest may adversely affect a group
represented by another governmental body. The Secretary of Agri-
culture is, for example, empowered to intervene in ICC hearings to
safeguard the interests of agricultural shippers. t As a result, the Court
has been asked in several cases to determine whether an ICC ruling
has been unduly favorable to carriers and unduly harsh on farmersY'
Disputes may also arise out of differing interpretations of the same
statute or the interrelationship of two competing statutory policies.
The foremost example of the latter type of conflict is the continuing
disagreement between the Justice Department and the independent
agencies as to the role of the antitrust laws in regulated industries.
7
Open conflict appears in several forms, such as an opposing brief on
a petition for certiorari,78 intervention as amicus curiae, or a frank
statement at oral argument. The following discussion focuses on the
clearest example of such conflicts-participation by the Solicitor Gen-
eral as a party before the Court voicing the Justice Department's op.
position on the merits to one or more of the independent agencies. 70
75. 7 U.S.C. § 1291(a)-(b) (1964).
76. See SG's Brief 14-31 and SG's Reply Brief 4-6, Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R.
v. United States, 366 U.S. 745 (1961); SG's Brief 12-13, Sec'y of Agriculture v. United
States, 350 U.S. 162 (1956); Sec'y of Agriculture v. ICC, 347 US. 645 (1954); United
States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 428-31 (1949).
77. On the general problem of the antitrust laws and regulated Industries, see
von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction, 67 HAv. L. REV. 929 (1954); Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition
in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HAav, L.
REv. 436 (1954); and Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Anti-trust Laws,
102 U. PA. L. Rav. 577 (1954).
Over the past decade, the ICC, because of its statutory prerogative to represent
itself and because of the number of recent railroad mergers, has been involved In
interagency disputes more often than any other agency. For an expression of one
individual participant's views seen from the Justice Department, see Turner, The Scope
of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1231-44
(1969). For a critical view of the ICC's performance in considerin; diverse economic
interests, see Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, The Railroads,
and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L. J. 467, 488-505 (1952).
One former staff member candidly admitted:
When one of the competing interests can be represented only by Department of
Justice attorneys or when the interest is one enforced by the Department itself, It is
somewhat more difficult for the Solicitor General to be completely neutral, and I
am not sure that he is.
Stern, supra note 14 at 157.
78. Alternatively the Solicitor General may authorize and join a petition for certiorari
and then submit an opposing brief on the merits.
79. The Solicitor General may engage in interagency conflict in which the Justice
Department was not involved below, or he may alter the Justice Department's position,
change sides, and precipitate a conflict in the Supreme Court, as occasionally happens In
suits in which the ICC and therefore the Attorney General are parties. See, e.g., SG's
Memo on appeal 1-2, ICC v. J-T Transport Co., 368 U.S. 83 (1961); Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 339 U.S. 142, 155-56 (1950) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting);
ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503 (1944).
The Solicitor General's participation may take the form of either a memorandum or
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In such cases, the Solicitor General also performs related functions in
the Court's behalf: enforcing strict standards of administrative review,
correcting for an agency's narrowness of focus in its assessment of the
public interest, and mitigating or expanding the clash of competing
statutory policies.
A. Enforcing Standards of Administrative Review
The Solicitor General openly disagrees with an agency in a case
heard on the merits roughly six to ten times per term,80 frequently in
the belief that an agency's ruling was not reasoned with sufficient rigor
or that its conclusions were not based upon substantial evidence. In
this respect, the Solicitor General acts like any aggrieved party which
seeks reversal of an agency decision.-" In Florida East Coast Ry. v.
United States,12 for example, a case in which the ICC approved the
merger of the Seaboard Air Line and Atlantic Coast Line Railroads,
the Solicitor General successfully urged that the case be remanded to
the ICC because it had failed to determine the extent of competition
among motor carriers, or how many shippers depended upon rail trans-
port, or the merger's effect upon the entire Southeast. The Solicitor
General argued that
had the Commission made the proper analysis and found-as we
think the record shows-that the adverse competitive effects of
the Atlantic-Seaboard merger would be great, it might still have
approved the merger. But it would have done so with its eyes
open.s3
a brief, alone or with another agency and with or without oral argumenL The difference
between a memorandum and a brief is one of degree, not of kind. A brief is designed
to persuade and is usually addressed to the merits of a case in its entirety. A memo-
randum consists of a short statement and discussion of only those facts relevant to the
Solicitor General's arguments, and is intended to inform the Court of the position of
the United States and of the case's implications for unrepresented parts of the federal
government.
80. There have been approximately sixty-five such cases of open conflict in the
past ten years, their frequency increasing since 1962.
81. He occasionally argues, however, against his client's financial interests. Compare,
e.g., Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 US. 446 (1948). with Kennedy v. Silas Mason
Co., 334 U.S. 249 (1948).
82. 886 U.S. 544 (1967).
83. SG's Brief at 8. The case had already been before the Supreme Court as Sea-
board Air Line R.R. v. United States, 382 U.S. 154 (1963), in which the Solictor General
had taken issue with the Commission's analysis of the public interest. The case had
been remanded. In another case, Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 379
U.S. 199 (1964), the Solicitor General successfully obtained a remand on the related
ground that the ICC had failed to provide a comprehensive ruling which the parties
and the courts could understand, Id., SG's Brief 6-11. See also, e.g., SG's Brief 12-14.
American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1963); SG's
Brief 23-29, Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. FMC, 390 US. 261 (1968); SG's Reply Brief, United
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In other cases, the Solicitor General has won a reversal by arguing
that the agency's findings were internally inconsistent or that its pro-
cedure represented an abuse of discretion. 84
In enforcing these standards, the Solicitor General has sought to
assure sufficiently well reasoned agency findings to permit informed
judicial review.85 Conversely the Solicitor General has also attempted
to confine the scope of judicial review to its proper boundaries, rec-
ommending remand to the agency because the court below made im-
proper findings of fact, policy determinations, or errors of law.80 In
making these arguments, the Solicitor General provides the Court with
a concise and impartial summary of what is often a very lengthy fac-
tual record.8 7
Like any aggrieved party, he has attempted to convince the Court
of a statute's true construction from which an agency has strayed,
either through a misinterpretation of congressional intent88 or by ex-
States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968); SG's Brief 11-13, 16-21, 26-27, Udall v.
FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); SG's Brief 19, Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Boston & M. R.R., 373
U.S. 372 (1963) (affirmed by an equally divided Court); SG's Brief passim, Sec'y of Agri-
culture v. United States, 350 U.S. 162 (1956).
84. For example, in Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States, 386 U.S. 372 (1967), the
first Penn-Central merger case, the ICC was reversed after ruling that as a prerequisite of
the merger three small railroads required protection but then omitting any safeguards in
its approval. In ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503 (1944), a conflict between the Price Ad-
ministrator and the ICC, the Solicitor General filed a memorandum supporting the
lower court's decision that the ICC had failed to consider adequately the inflationary
effects of a wartime rate increase on the Hudson Tubes. SG's Memo 7-8. In A.L. Mechling
Barge Lines, Inc. v. United States, 376 U.S. 375 (1964), the ICC authorized a waiver of the
statutory requirement regarding short-haul rates and denied competing barge lines'
requests to introduce evidence of discriminatory effect, arguing that the issue was remote
and that it could be raised in a subsequent proceeding. The Court reversed unanimously,
accepting the Solicitor General's argument that the ICC's procedure was irrational,
wasteful, contrary to congressional intent, and likely to produce irreparable harm to
competition.
85. See, e.g., SG's Brief 15, Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 379 U.S.
199 (1964); cf. SG's Brief 44-47, Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Boston & M. R.R., 373 US. 372
(1963). The requirement that ICC rulings be sufficiently comprehensible to allow judicial
review was expressed by Justice Frankfurter in Sec'y of Agriculture v. United States, q50
U.S. 162, 175 (1956) (concurring opinion).
86. See, e.g., SG's Memo 8-9, 11-12, Arrow Transportation Co. v. Cincinnati, N.O. &
T.P. Ry., 379 US. 642 (1965). In United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968),
the lower court erred because another case setting the legal standard in bank merger cases
had been decided in the interim.
87. On occasion, he also recommends the precise directions to the agency which a
remand order should contain. SG's Memo 9-12, Arrow Transportation Co. v. Cincinnati,
N.O. & T.P. Ry., 379 U.S. 642 (1965); SG's Brief 37-38, A.L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 376 U.S. 375 (1964). In Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. United States, 382 U.S.
154 (1965), the Solicitor General included a policy discussion in his memorandum as to
why the ICC should not be required to apply the Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964)
test to railroad mergers. He contended that the criterion of possible substantial lessening
of competition tells little about the scope or magnitude of possible anti-competitive
effects and is therefore not sufficiently refined for an agency which must balance the
interests involved. SG's Brief 7-10.
88. ICC v. J-T Transport, Inc., 368 U.S. 83 (1961) is perhaps the clearest example since
the case and the conflict hinged entirely upon the proper interpretation of the 1957
Amendments to the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1964). A similar ap.
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ceeding its statutory authority,60 often suggesting his own alternative
reading. In Western Pacific R.R. v. United States,90 for example, the
Solicitor General argued that the ICC's ruling would lead to contra-
dictory and capricious results which would derogate from the con-
gressional policy of encouraging competition and discouraging discrim-
ination.91
B. Correcting an Agency's Narrowness of Focus
The Solicitor General's policy recommendations extend beyond
efforts at policing the agencies in their procedures and interpretations
of statutes. One commentator has stated that a major cause of intra-
governmental conflict is the fact that agencies' trial lawyers and spe-
cialized attorneys have a more constricted view of the public interest
than do appellate lawyers.92 The Solicitor General often argues for
either a more even-handed balancing of different policies within an
agency's jurisdiction, or for greater agency sensitivity to the broader
implications of its ruling. Thus, the Solicitor General has disagreed
vth the ICC on numerous occasions because he felt that a ruling,
which might be justified by one part of a statute, was not in accord
with the National Transportation Policy. 3 Such cases generally arise
when the ICC sets rates which the Solicitor General feels will ad-
versely affect intermodal competition.
9 4
proach was taken in FMC v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958) in which the petitioner
was in conflict with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Solicitor General.
89. SG's Memo on Pet. for Cert. 4-7, Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442 (1934) involved a
simple matter of statutory authority. In Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958), the
Secretary of the Army and the Solicitor General filed a joint brief, but Mr. Justice Clark
noted in dissent that the "Justice Department and the Army are at loggerheads over the
proper disposition of this case on the merits," 355 U.. at 586. The Solicitor General felt
that if the Secretary's action in granting less than an honorable discharge -was subject
to judicial review, he had exceeded his authority.
90. 382 U.S. 237 (1965).
91. SG's Brief 15-21. The argument prevailed. Similar reasoning was employed in the
SG's Brief in American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville 8- N. R.R. Co., 392 U.S. 571
(1968), but the Court refused to follow the Solicitor General's suggestion. The SG's Brief
noted at 17 n.6, the concurrence of the Department of Transportation. The Solicitor
General prevailed in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 339 US. 142 (1950)
on grounds of congressional intent and logic.
92. Stem, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 HARv. L. Rrx. 759,760 (1951).
93. 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1964).
94. For example, see the SGs Brief in the following cases: American Commercial
Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968) (barge.railroad); ICC v. New York,
N.H. g: H. R.R., 372 U.S. 744 (1963) (water carrier-railroad); ICC v. J-T Transport Co.,
368 U.S. 83 (1961) (contract v. common carrier); American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United
States, 364 US. 1 (1960) (trck-railroad); ICC v. Mechling, 3120 US. 567 (1947) (barge-
railroad). See also SG's Brief 27-28, 39-42, Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261
(1968); FMC v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 US. 481 (1958). For a case involving the Comptroller
of the Currency see SG's Brief 54, United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361
(1967).
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C. Mitigating or Expanding the Clash of Policies
When the Solicitor General is unable to prevent a conflict from com-
ing before the Court, he may attempt to provide a rationale to avoid
a choice between differing statutory policies. In Volkswagenwerk A.G.
v. FMC,95 for instance, the Federal Maritime Commission approved a
discriminatory rate structure designed to finance a collective bargaining
agreement. The Solicitor General persuaded the Court that the em-
ployers' means of paying for the contract was of no direct concern to
the union and that there was no conflict between the policies of the
antitrust and labor lawsY0
When the Solicitor General engages in temporizing, he may recom-
mend a remedy, like remanding for further findings of fact, which
sidesteps the problem.97 He may also suggest that the Court decide a
case narrowly on the facts98 to avoid creating an unworkable rule.
The Solicitor General may also present to the Court policy con-
siderations which represent the interests of agencies not party to the
suit. In two recent Supreme Court cases, for example, the Solicitor
General presented the foreign policy implications of an agency deci-
sion. In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,0
the Solicitor General's brief indicated the concern of the State and
Defense Departments about an NLRB decision extending its juris-
diction to include ships beneficially owned by Americans but flying
foreign flags and carrying foreign crews.100 Similar concern was voiced
in Canada Packers, Ltd. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,101 where the ICC
claimed the power to set international through rates.102
95. SG's Memo 1-2, 7-8, 390 US. 261 (1968).
96. SG's Brief 30-32. But see 390 U.S. at 307-12 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Justice
Harlan was also concerned about the labor problem but joined the Court since he could
see no rationale for the FMC's decision. Id. at 289.90. For a similar example, see SG's
Memo 1-2, 7-8, ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503 (194).
97. SG's Brief 31-32, Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States, 386 US. 372 (1967); SG's
Brief 18-20, Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 379 U.S. 199, 200 (1964).
In California v. FPC, 369 US. 482 (1962), the first El Paso case, the Justice Department
allowed the FPC to rule on the El Paso-Pacific Northwest merger before suit was brought.
Justices Harlan and Stewart noted in dissent that the Solicitor General, representing the
public interest, had favored the attacked procedure and that his point of view would
avoid the difficult problems of primary jurisdiction raised by the case. 369 U.S. at 492,
496 n.3. Similar trust in the Justice Department was expressed by the same Justices in
dissent in the third El Paso case, Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., 386 U.S. 129, 156-58 (1967).
98. Brief for Appellee 26 (SG's Note), Communications Workers of America, AFL.CIO
v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 479 (1960). See also SG's Brief (with ICC against the Secretary of
Agriculture) 56-69, Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. United States, 366 U.S. 745 (1961).
99. 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
100. SG's Amicus Brief 3-14, 37-50; SG's Brief for Pet. for Cert. 11-12 In McLcod v.
Empresa Hondurena de Vapores (consolidated with above, No. 858, 1961 Term).
101. 385 U.S. 182 (1966).
102. SG's Amicus Brief 11-13 (the ICC also filed an amicus brief).
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D. Conclusion
The Solicitor General has several strategies for handling intragov-
ernmental conflicts. He may abstain from the controversy, either by
authorizing and not joining a petition for certiorari or by stating his
neutrality on the merits. 0 3 The disadvantage of this policy is that it
leaves the Court uninformed as to his views; as a result, since 1961,
the Solicitor General has rarely abstained in cases heard on the
merits.1 0-
The Solicitor General may present both sides of the conflict to the
Court and offer his own views as to the proper resolution. In the un-
usual case of St. Regis Paper Co. v. FTC,
03 a conflict developed be-
tween the Bureau of the Census, on the one side, and the FTC and
the Antitrust Division on the other, as to whether copies of Census
reports kept in company files were privileged documents. The Solicitor
General argued both sides in his brief and at oral argument, and,
though he voiced agreement with the Census Bureau's position that
such files were privileged,1
0 he failed to persuade the Court.
103. In Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, '65 US. 651 (1961), the
Solicitor General failed to oppose the petition for certiorari, in which position the NLRB
joined. The Board filed its own brief on the merits which the Solicitor General authorized
though he did not file a brief of his own. In Public Service Comm'n of New York v. FPC,
361 US. 195 (1959) (remanded per curiam), the FPC filed a petition opposing certiorari in
which the Solicitor General failed to join though he indicated his authorization. In
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951), a Robinson-Patman case in which the FTC
was reversed, the Solicitor General did not oppose granting certiorari, Standard Oil Co.
v. FTC, cert. granted, 338 U.S. 865-66 (1951), and allowed the FTC to proceed indepen-
dently because the Justice Department felt it had adequate representation, having ex-
pressed its views to Congress. See Stem, supra note 92, at 768. The Solicitor General also
refused to participate in the government's case in Peters v. Hobby, 3-19 US. 331 (1955).
Lewis, Our Extraordinary Solicitor General, THE RPoRiraR, May 5, 1955, at 27. Thomas
Thacher, Solicitor General under President Hoover, used to tell the Court he had signed
the brief but did not agree with the government's case. Id. at 31. In some cases the
Solicitor General had mysteriously not participated at all. In ICC v. Inland Waterays
Corp., 319 U.S. 671, 683 (1943), the Court noted the lack of justice Department participa-
tion, the reason being "the existence of a conflict in litigation betw.een coordinate
agencies of the government, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission." And in McLean Truddng Co. v. United States, 321 U.S.
67 (1944), a seminal ICC case, the United States confessed error below and did not
participate in the Supreme Court. The case involved the relationship betwveen the Trans-
portation Act of 1940 and the antitrust laws.
104. Compare Udall v. FPC, 387 US. 428 (1967) with United States ex re. Chapman
v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153 (1953).
105. 368 US. 208 (1961).
106. The case arose out of a demand by the FTC for copies of census reports filed by
St. Regis. Some were produced, but the company balked at revealing all of them, contend-
ing that since the originals were privileged, the copies ought to be as well. Mhen the
case arrived at the Supreme Court, it had become a conflict between the Antitrust
Division and the FTC on the one side, and the Department of Commerce and the Bureau
of the Census on the other. One brief was presented to the Court and the Solicitor General
argued both sides of the case. The Solicitor General noted in his summary of argument:
Instead of burdening the Court with briefs from different agencies, we attempt here
to set forth the competing arguments as effectively and objectively as possible. The
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The relative impartiality that the Solicitor General demonstrated
in St. Regis occurs infrequently. Where basic policy considerations
involving competing statutory or economic interests are involved, the
Solicitor General considers it his responsibility to resolve the conflict
himself. Where his power over petitions for certiorari allows him to
suppress the conflict, it may never reach the Court. Where depart-
ments or agencies are themselves the litigants, as in Udall v. FPC,1°7
resolution has, however, often been left to the Court with the Solicitor
General actively participating on one side.
The Solicitor General's staff suggested two rationales for shielding
the Court from intragovernmental conflicts: (1) that the Executive
has a positive obligation to present one position to the Court and (2)
that the muting of conflict also avoids overburdening the Court with
an excessive number of petitions or arguments.
The bias in favor of resolving conflicts within the Executive, espe-
cially where the regulatory agencies are concerned, seems ill-consid-
ered. As previously discussed, where the Solicitor General's disagree-
ment with an agency as to the desirability of seeking certiorari stems
from policy disputes, the agency should be allowed access. The fact
that such policy disagreements involve intragovernmental conflict
should not alter the appropriateness of the Court's assuming the respon-
sibility for resolution. Furthermore, since Congress has entrusted dif.
ferent agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and sometimes opposing
statutory responsibilities, placing the power to choose among them
within the Executive further jeopardizes the regulatory agencies' in-
dependence.
Where an issue has reached the Court, the presentation of the con-
flict existing within the Executive, and certainly between the Execu-
tive and the regulatory commissions, may encourage more informed
decision-making by the Court. The argument for allowing conflicting
agencies and departments access to the Court is grounded in the fun-
damental axioms of the adversary process, presumptions which appear
to be especially valid when the Court is confronted with important
choices between statutory policies or possible holdings with differing
Solicitor General is of the view that if the Court readies the question, the statutory
privilege should extend to the retained copies but not to the underlying data In the
company's books and records upon which the reports are based.
SG's Brief 15.
The Solicitor General argued that the question need not be reached since the privilege
had been waived, id. at 16-25, but he felt very strongly that given the extent of disagree.
ment and the presence of an independent agency as a party, confession of error was
inappropriate and that the Court should settle the issue. Id. at 28.
107. 387 US. 428 (1967).
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and indeterminate effects. The more aware the Court is of the com-
peting policies involved, the more informed its decision is likely to be.
The disadvantages of denying free access were pointed out by Justice
Harlan, who concurred in United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.05
on a record which he noted was unsatisfactory because it did not in-
dude a brief from the FPC, one of the true defendants.00 The Court
may have been similarly deprived of the views of the Comptroller of
the Currency in the Bank Merger Act cases."10
The Solicitor General's propensity to mitigate conflict also results,
it was claimed in interviews, in a "watering down" of the agency's
positions."" Authorization by the Solicitor General for an agency to
file a brief when it felt its position was being modified would assure
the Court that the government's position did not represent a lowest
common denominator amalgam of views. Furthermore, allowing freer
access to the Court in cases of conflict would increase the Solicitor
General's latitude to express his own views of the public interest
without risking foreclosure of the agency's presentation of its divergent
position. The maintenance of a relatively impartial Solicitor General
in that role is vital to the Court since it benefits from his trustworthy
reading of the record and may often find unaided choice between two
expert agencies or complex policies extremely difficult, especially if,
as is often the case, there are no congressional guidelines and only the
Court's policy views upon which to rely.
III. Confession of Error
In confessing error, the Solicitor General may agree completely with
the petitioner and argue for the same outcome on the merits, or he
may accept only one of the petitioner's contentions and urge that the
Court remand the case for review by the court of appeals or, if the
flaw is serious, a new trial. In rare cases, the Solicitor General may
108. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
109. 576 US. at 663-64.
110. The Comptroller of the Currency did not file a brief in United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) or in United States v. First City Nat'l Bank,
386 U.S. 561 (1967). By the time he entered in his own defense in United States v. Third
Nat'l Bank, 890 U.S. 171 (1968), most of the issues were settled.
111. In addition to disagreements over ordinary briefs, the following cazes are
illustrative. In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 878 U.S. 341 (1963), the Solicitor
General, as amicus, argued a position between that of the Antitrust Division and the
SEC. And in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., S92 U.S. S90 (1968), he
held informal hearings to reach a compromise between the viecs of the FCC, the
Copyright Office, and the Antitrust Division, none of which was happy with the end-
result.
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confess error and leave the determination of the remedy to the
Court.1 12 Generally, the Court's decision, no matter how comprehen-
sive the confession, is a memorandum opinion and therefore of little
precedential value."13
The cases in which the Solicitor General confesses error almost in-
variably involve appeals of criminal convictions,"14 the errors con-
stantly changing with the law and the area of the Court's concern. A
substantial number of the confessions, however, reflect isolated and
varied blunders by the trial court, the circuit court, or the prosecutor.
Thus, the Solicitor General has confessed error where the method of
jury selection was clearly unfair,"r where there was no (or only im-
properly admitted) evidence to support conviction,116 where the judge
gave erroneous instructions to the jury,117 and where the sentence was
incorrectly recorded"18 or wrongly computed. 19 In other cases, the
trial court made no finding as to the constitutionality of a search 120
or the circuit court committed an error of law, sometimes as a result
112. For examples of the Solicitor General's leavinq the remedy to the Court, see
SG's Brief Opposing Pet. for Cert. 50-51, Pope v. United States, 392 U.S. 651 (1908);
SG's Motion to Remand 5-6, Ferguson v. United States, 375 US. 962 (1964); SG's Brief 31,
Saldana v. United States, 365 US. 646 (1961).
113. See, R. STRN & E. GRmsNtsAN, SUPREME COURT PRAcTICE § 5-12 (3d ed. 1962); Note,
Individualized Criminal Justice in the Supreme Court: A Study of Dispositional Decision
Making, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1260 (1968).
114. Three exceptions over the last ten years are Richmond Television Corp. v. United
States, 382 US. 68 (1965) (tax case, circuit court erred in interpreting record); Crest Finance
Co., Inc. v. United States, 368 US. 347 (1961) (competing tax and creditor's lien, error
of law in the circuit court's interpretation of the governing decision); and Department of
Revenue of Illinois v. United States, 368 U.S. 30 (1961) (intergovernmental tax case, re-
manded to district court to reassess need for injunction as Solicitor General suggested),
115. In Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544 (1964), the petitioner was tried on related
offenses in two consecutive trials. The panel from which the second jury was chosen
heard the first jury's general verdict and the polling of the jurors.
116. SG's Memo on Pet. for Cert., Baxa v. United States, 381 US. 353 (1965); SG's
Memo on Pet. for Cert., Rogers v. United States, 376 US. 188 (1964); and the old and
amusing case of Bates v. United States, 323 US. 15 (1944).
117. SG's Memo on Pet. for Cert. 382 US. 367 (1966); SG's Memo on Pet. for Cert.,
Chaifetz v. United States, 366 US. 209 (1961); SG's Memo on Pet. for Cert., Davis v. United
States, 364 US. 505 (1960).
118. In Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52 (1963), the oral sentence was for a year;
the written judgment for a year and a day. The Solicitor General argued in his Memo In
Opposition to the Pet. for Cert. that the government had never opposed correction of
the sentence but felt it should be done in the district court. Three Justices agreed In
dissent. In Grabina v. United States, 369 U.S. 426 (1962), the judge imposed sentence In
the defendant's absence.
119. Robison v. United States, 390 U.S. 198 (1968); Nagelberg v. United States, 377
US. 266 (1964); Saldana v. United States, 365 US. 646 (1961), involved problems of
attempted withdrawals of guilty pleas or related errors by the trial judge.
120. Martinez v. United States, 380 US. 260 (1965); Murray v. United States, 880 U.S.
527 (1965). For other trial court errors affecting constitutional rights, see Wood v. United
States, 389 US. 20 (1967), and Ferguson v. United States, 375 US. 962 (1964).
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of an intervening Court decision, or ignored an important legal
issue.21
Though confessing error in such cases places the interests of justice
above the short-range goal of securing a conviction,
1 - this is only one
of the purposes served. By confessing error, the Solicitor General often
attempts to prevent premature or unguided decisions by the Court and
to protect the Executive's freedom of action from intervention by the
Court.
A. Protecting the Court
Upon confessing error, the Solicitor General will, on occasion, argue
that the Court should not rule on the issue involved but rather remand
to the lower court for a more adequate consideration. For example, in
Scott v. United States' 3 the petitioner had been denied even a partial
trial transcript because the circuit court felt his legal claim was friv-
olous. The Solicitor General confessed error because two intervening
decisions by the same circuit court had strengthened petitioner's
argument on the merits and expanded his right to a record of the gov-
ernment's evidence. He added that he was not conceding a more gen-
eral right than the lower court had permitted and that remanding the
case would avoid the difficulty of determining the extent of a defen-
dant's right to a transcript or the precision with which a claimed
error must be alleged.
124
The Solicitor General has also urged the Court not to decide a case
with a full opinion because a problem is unusual and unlikely to
recur. To attempt to provide guidelines on the basis of a unique
case might lead the Court into a quagmire, waste judicial energies, or
raise unanticipated problems concerning related issues.:- The Court
121. See, e.g., Levine v. United States, 383 U.S. 265 (1966); Giova v. Rosenberg, 379
U.S. 18 (1964); Goodman v. United States, 368 U.S. 14 (1961).
122. See Cox, The Government in the Supreme Court, 44 C11L B. RPcoRD 223, 223-25
(1963); Stern, The Solicitor General's Office and Administrative Agency Litigation, 46
A.B.AJ. 154, 157-58 (1960); Perlman, The Work of the Office of the Solicitor General of the
United States, 54 TRANs. MD. ST. B. Ass'rt 265, 286-90 (1949).
123. 374 U.S. 502 (1963).
124. SG's Memo on Pet. for Cert. See also SG's Memo on Pet. for Cert. 6.7, Millan-
Garda v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 382 US. 69 (1965); SG's Memo on Pet.
for Cert. 9-12, Milutin v. Bouchard, 370 US. 292 (1962).
125. For example, the SG's Memo on Pet. for Cert. 5-6, Leonard v. United States, 378
US. 544 (1964) pointed out that the method of jury selection employed was obsolescent
and that the case was sufficiently unimportant to warrant denying certiorari, but the
Court might want to issue an opinion without plenary argument to guide the lower
courts. In Saldana v. United States, 365 US. 646 (1961), the Solicitor General conceded
1,169
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generally concurs, though there have been a few exceptions when the
Court has decided to hear a case on the merits. 120 The related danger
of completely disregarding the Solicitor General's advice, as the dis-
sent pointed out in one case in which the Court laid down a broader
rule than the Solicitor General had conceded,12 7 is that the Court acts
without the benefit of briefs and arguments on the relevant points.12 8
B. Protecting the Executive
Confession of error is also a device for shielding the Executive,
primarily the Department of Justice, from the Court. In order to per-
suade the Court that it need not decide a case on broad constitutional
grounds, the Solicitor General has often presented the Court with a
statement of existing Justice Department policy to establish that sim-
ilar cases will not reappear before the Court or that the unexplored
nature of the problem justifies a continuation of Executive discretion.
By so doing, the Solicitor General can, as one member of his office
stated in an interview, slow the development of the law.
In Redmond v. United States, 29 for example, the petitioners, a mar-
ried couple, were prosecuted for sending nude photographs of them-
selves through the mails to be developed despite a Justice Department
policy to prosecute private offenders only if they have repeatedly
mailed obscene material. 1 0 The Solicitor General confessed error be-
cause of the violation of Department policy. The majority decided the
case on this basis, but three Justices concurred separately on constitu-
tional grounds."'1
A similar tactic was used in several electronic eavesdropping cases.
Acknowledging the Court's supervisory role, the Solicitor General
confessed error, stating that the Justice Department was reviewing its
past and present uses of electronic devices to prevent the introduction
that the unusual trial proceedings so departed from the appearance of evenhanded
justice that extraordinary judicial relief might be proper, avoiding a disposition of the
case on the petitioner's alleged trial errors. SG Brief at 29-31. See also SG's Motion to
Vacate the Judgment and Dismiss the Indictment 3-6, Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529
(1960).
126. E.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Silber v. United States, 370 U.S.
717 (1962).
127. Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26, 29 (1965) (Harlan and Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
128. Id. at 30-31. See also Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice: A Critique, 69
HAv. L. R v. 707, 721-22 (1956).
129. 384 U.S. 264 (1966).
130. SG's Memo on Pet. for Cert. 3-4.
131. 384 U.S. at 265.
1470
Vol. 78: 1442, 1969
Government Litigation in the Supreme Court
of tainted evidence.132 The Solicitor General may thereby have post-
poned introduction of stricter judicial standards.a
The credibility of the Solicitor General's representations depends
ultimately on the continued course of Executive behavior. Confessions
of error demonstrate to the Court and the staff of the Justice Depart-
ment that deviations from policy will not be permitted to succeed, and
thus act as an internal control device. The eavesdropping cases3 il-
lustrate this well: in the cases since 1966, the Solicitor General has
reported to the Court any cases where evidence was obtained il-
legally. To do this, he has had to ferret out data on the activities of
FBI agents who were wont to give information to Justice Department
attorneys without revealing its source or the means by which it was
collected.13 By acting as a watchdog, the Solicitor General may have
restrained perhaps over-zealous FBI agents in their surveillance.130 In
132. SG's Supp Memo 4-5, Schipani v. United States, 385 U.S. 372 (1966). The Court
was first informed of the Department's policy in the SG's Supp Memo, Black v. United
States, 585 U.S. 26 (1966).
133. Cf. Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316 (1969); Giordano v. United States,
394 U.S. 310 (1969); Alderman v. United States, 394 US. 165 (1969).
The Solicitor General has been successful in preserving the government's practice of
plea bargaining with informers and its policy on multple federal prosecutions. SG's
Memo on Pet. for Cert. 6-8, Robison v. United States, 390 U.S. 198 (1968); SG's Memo on
Pet. for Cert. 6-9, Nagelberg v. United States, 377 US. 266 (1964).
For other examples of avoidance see SG's Motion to Vacate Judgment and Dismiss the
Indictment 3-6, and Memo on Pet. for Cert. 7-8, Petite v. United States, 861 U.S. 529
(1960); SW's Memo on Pet. for Cert. 6-7, lMfillan-Garcia v. Immigration & Naturalization
Service, 382 US. 69 (1965); SGs Memo on Pet. for Cert., Scott v. United States, 374 U.S.
502 (1963). Another confession of error may have avoided a Court opinion on the definition
of a conscientious objector: SG's Brief 9-14 for the combined cases of Parker v. United
States, 372 U.S. 608 (1963), and Harshman v. United States, 372 U.S. 607 (1963). For an
example of the failure of the Solicitor General to prevent the Court from acting, com-
pare the SG's Memo and the Court's opinion in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968).
134. E.g., Roberts v. United States, 389 U.S. 18 (1967); Markis v. United States, 387
U.S. 425 (1967); Hoffa v. United States, 387 U.S. 231 (1967); O'Brien v. United States, 386
U.S. 345 (1967); Shipani v. United States, 385 U.S. 372 (1966); Black v. United States,
385 U.S. 26 (1966).
135. In Black v. United States, 85 U.S. 26 (1966), the Court asked the Solicitor General
for information as to the type of apparatus involved, the nature of the authorization for
its installation, the statute or Executive Order relied upon, the existence of logs, the
uses to which the information had been put, etc. The answer revealed no specific
statutory provision other than the Attorney General's general powers and no procedure
for authorizing the use of such devices other than wiretaps, prior to 1965 when presidential
guidelines were issued. SG's Supp Memo 1-4.
136. In Hoffa v. United States, 887 U.S. 231 (1967), the FBI eavesdropped on one
defendant in a conspiracy trial. The Solicitor General argued for an evidentary hearing
on the overheard defendant's conviction only. A new trial he argued, given the
inadvertence of the incident, would not serve as a prophylactic. SG's Brief Opposing
Cert. 70-73. The Court disagreed in one respect and allowed all of the defendants evi-
dentiary hearings. In SG's Memo on Pet. for Cert. 6-7, Bennett v. United States, 385 U.S.
4 (1966), the Solicitor General, similarly, reviewed the file and confessed error bemuse
information was withheld which could have aided petitioner's defense against charges
of being a subversive.
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less spectacular fashion confessions of error also operate to correct
discrete blunders. 137 Even if confessions of error create no precedent
for judges, the outcome of each case creates a precedent within the
Justice Department.'3"
The effectiveness of confessions of error is, however, sporadic and
limited. The Solicitor General is far removed from the trial court and
the decision to prosecute. 139 He has no control over United States at-
torneys other than to deny them the satisfaction of victory in those
few cases which arrive in the Supreme Court. Even staff members in
the Solicitor General's office had doubts about the extent to which
Justice Department lawyers heed the lessons of confessions of error.
The Solicitor General has argued,140 however, that confessions of error
are indispensable when a case arises which presents unanticipated
policy problems for which there are either no relevant guidelines or
only loopholes in the Attorney General's directives.
Confessions of error also permit the Solicitor General to resolve
delicate problems of conflict between the Department of Justice and
the agencies whose litigation it handles. In Oestereich v. Local Bd. No.
11,141 the interpretation of a crucial provision of the Selective Service
Act of 1967 was at issue. The differing viewpoints of both the Justice
Department and the Selective Service System were presented in the
government's brief. By confessing error and suggesting a narrow
rationale for decision, the Solicitor General enabled the Court and
the recalcitrant Selective Service System to avoid a constitutional
challenge to the draft system.
42
The success of the Solicitor General's confessions of error in such
cases is only as effective as the Solicitor General's arguments.4 3 The
Solicitor General has felt that he should not foreclose the respondent
137. See, e.g., Redmond v. United States, 884 U.S. 264 (1966); Nagelberg v. United
States, 377 U.S. 266 (1964) (U.S. attorney failed to communicate to trial court that
purpose in acquiescing in motion to withdraw petitioner's guilty plea was to reprosecute
for lesser charge).
138. Compare SG's Brief 37-39, Saldana v. United States, 865 U.S. 646 (1961), with
SG's Memo in Response to Pet. for Cert., Marakar v. United States, 370 U.S. 723 (1962).
189. A confession of error may not prevent the government's lawyers from attempting
to win on remand with an argument rejected in the Supreme Court. See United States
v. Crest Finance Co., 302 F.2d 568 (7th Cir. 1962), discussed in 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 40A (1965), at 1058 n.8.
140. SG's Motion to Vacate Judgment and Dismiss the Indictment, Petite v. United
States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
141. 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
142. See also United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (conflict between Congress
and the Executive; Congress appointed own counsel).
143. A lower court example involving the ICC is Utah Poultry & Farmers Coopera-
tive, 119 F. Supp. 846 (D. Utah 1954), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Sec'y of Agriculture
v. United States, 350 U.S. 162 (1956).
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agency from presenting its point of view,144 though the impact of tie
Solicitor General's belief that the agency's position is without merit
will not be lost on the Court.
C. Conclusion
The danger created by confessions of error is the possibility that the
case is being decided de facto by the Solicitor General. Burdened by a
growing docket, the Court is naturally tempted to accept a confession
of error, since it disposes of a case, often involving difficult issues,
without plenary argument. On the other hand, the Court is jealous of
its powers and concerned about its institutional responsibility to safe-
guard constitutional rights. Thus in almost every opinion the Court
has stated ritualistically that its decision is based on both the Solicitor
General's confession of error and its independent consideration of the
record. 145
In several cases the tension between the competing values of avoid-
ing constitutional questions and maintaining the Court's independence
was obvious. In Petite v. United States, 40 for example, the Solicitor
General confessed error after petitioner had been prosecuted in two
different federal courts for related offenses arising from the same oc-
currence. This action, the Solicitor General argued, was inconsistent
with the Attorney General's related guidelines for multiple prosecu-
tions in federal and state courts. The majority went along with the
Solicitor General, noting that it did not intimate any opinion on the
144. SG's Brief 28, St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 203 (1961); and see
SG's Brief 15, Oestereich v. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
145. On occasion, the Court has done more than examine the record. See. eg., Bruton
v. United States, 391 US. 123 (1968) (argument rejected); Wood v. United States, 389
US. 20 (1967) (remedy and argument); O'Brien v. United States, 386 US. 345 (1967)
(remedy).
146. 361 US. 529 (1960). The classic and oft-quoted statement of the proper relation.
ship between the Court and the government appears in Young v. United States, 315 US.
257, 258-59 (1942) (issue of statutory construction):
The public trust reposed in the law enforcement officers of the Government re-
quires that they be quick to confess error when, in their opinion, a miscarriage of
justice may result from their remaining silent. But such a confession does not relieve
the Court of the performance of the judicial function. The considered judgment of
the law enforcement officers that reversible error has been committed is entitled to
great weight, but our judicial obligations compel us to examine independently the
errors confessed. The public interest that a result be reached which promotes a
well-ordered society is foremost in every criminal proceeding. That interest is en-
trusted to our consideration and protection as well as to that of the enforcing officers.
Furthermore, our judgments are precedents and the proper administration of the
criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulations of the parties. (Citations
omitted.)
Cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 US. 40, 58-59 (1968).
1473
The Yale Law Journal
double jeopardy issue.147 In an opinion which underscores the Court's
dependence on the Solicitor General, Chief Justice Warren concurred,
stating that the policy of avoidance must yield to the Court's respon-
sibility for settling constitutional questions where the issue is squarely
presented and the Solicitor General's only purpose is to avoid a dam-
aging precedent. Petite was not such a case, the Chief Justice felt,
since the government had brought the case inadvertently and did not
intend to bring similar prosecutions in the future.1 48 Three Justices,
however, were not satisfied because, in the absence of a reversal on the
merits and a written policy statement on precisely this point, the Jus-
tice Department would continue to possess wide discretion in the
area.14
9
In other cases, the dissent has expressed suspicion of the Solicitor
General's purposes, suggesting that he might have been sacrificing one
case to save another 10 or that his recommended remedy did not ade-
quately resolve the constitutional issue or protect the petitioner.15'
On occasion, the Court has taken a more active role, reversing on its
own motion or prodding the Solicitor General into confessing error.
1 2
The Solicitor General also faces the difficult problem of conflicting
interests. Since the Court is likely to accept his representations, the
Solicitor General's decision to confess error poses a dilemma since it
forces him to choose among his roles as lawyer for the government,
protector of the public interest in justice to the individual, officer of
the Court, and contributor to the orderly development of constitu-
tional law.153 The Court can exert some control by deciding a later
case on the merits if a problem proves to be more pervasive than the
Solicitor General had represented. The post hoc nature of this remedy
suggests the extent of the Court's dependence on the Solicitor General
and the importance of a good faith performance of his duties.
147. 361 U.S. at 530.
148. Id. at 532.
149. Id. at 533.
150. Casey v. United States, 343 US. 808, 811-12 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
151. Granello v. United States, 386 US. 1019 (1967) (cert. denied, Douglas, J., and
Fortas, J., and Warren, C.J., dissenting in two separate opinions); Redmond v. United
States, 384 US. 264 (1966) (Stewart, Black, and Douglas, JJ. concurring.)
152. Cf. SG's Memo and Supp Memo, Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1960); Silber
v. United States, 370 U.S. 717 (1962); and cases cited in note 145 supra.
153. More mundane considerations of a personal nature may also be involved:
The Solicitor General is aware that to confess error will not only infuriate the
attorneys who have handled the case for the Government below, but also the judges
who were persuaded to decide in the Government's favor. It is very embarrassing to
meet these judges shortly after one has confessed error on them in the Supreme
Court.
Stern, supra note 14, at 158.
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IV. Participation as Amicus Curiae
The amicus device is admirably suited to and frequently utilized
by the Solicitor General in his relationship to the Court. 154 Amicus
participation usually involves none of the theoretical limitations of
an adversary stance and allows the Solicitor General freer reign to
point the Court in directions he deems desirable.
Procedurally, the Solicitor General's amicus participation is sharply
differentiated from that of private parties. While nongovernmental
interests require either the consent of all the parties to a case or the
special permission of the Court to submit an amicus brief, the Solici-
tor General is permitted to file on his own.'; Private amicus briefs
prior to consideration of the jurisdictional statement or the petition
for writ of certiorari are expressly "not favored,"1 510 while the Solicitor
General often intervenes at this early stage. And perhaps most signifi-
cantly, the Supreme Court itself frequently invites the Solicitor Gen-
eral to submit his views either on the merits or prior to the Court's
decision to grant or deny certiorari.
The Solicitor General as amicus performs several functions: pro-
tecting the Government, which may be a real party in interest or whose
statutory policies may be at stake; providing the Court with otherwise
unavailable information; providing a flexible strategy in dealing with
independent agencies; and presenting his own views on important
constitutional issues.
A. Representing the Government's Interests
In some instances of amicus participation, the government may be
the real party in interest, and the Solicitor General appears in an
154. Amicus curiae participation was conceived of at common law as a partial solution
to one of the most serious shortcomings of the adversary process. Although traditionally
defined as a detached servant of the court----he acts for no one but simply seeks to give
information to the court"---the courts have never given extended consideration or imposed
confining restrictions on the role that amicus may play. Krislov, The Amicus Curiae
Brief, From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE I.J. 694 (1963). One of the early common
law justifications was the possibility of collusion among the private litigants. A similar
spectre was raised during the 1990"s when derivative suits by stockholders against their
corporations challenging the constitutionality of New Deal taxes and social reform pro-
grams were at issue. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). The Judiciary
Act of 1937, ch. 754, § 1, 50 Stat. 751, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2403 (1964), gave the government the
right to participate as a direct party in litigation involving the constitutionality of
federal legislation. The Solicitor General is in charge of authorizing such intervention.
28 C.F.R. § 0.21 (1969). See 1967 Arr'y GEN. AN,. RE'. 33.
155. Sup. Ct. R. 42.
156. Id. Rule 44 also warns that motions for permission from the Court to participate
in oral argument where one of the parties refuses to release a part of his time is not
favored unless made on behalf of the United States or a state or territorial government.
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adversary posture. For example, in American Oil Co. v. Neill t'0 al-
though the suit was nominally by a taxpayer contesting the validity
of an Idaho tax on out-of-state transactions, the taxpayer was a govern-
ment contractor under an agreement whereby the United States agreed
to pay any state tax imposed. And in Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Wag-
gonner, s58 another suit by a taxpayer against a state, the Solicitor Gen-
eral appeared to protect the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction over
government land.
More often, the Solicitor General appears as amicus curiae, on his
own or the Court's initiative, because the interests of an important
statutory policy are at stake. For example, Minnesota Mining v. New
Jersey Wood Co.'r9 involved the question whether the time for bring-
ing a private Clayton Act Section 7 action was extended while the
Federal Trade Commission was investigating the merger.0 0 In Nash
v. Florida Industrial Comm'n,'0 ' Florida refused an employee unem-
ployment compensation because he filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the National Labor Relations Board.102
B. Providing the Court with Information
The issues presented may require the Solicitor General to furnish
the Court with information which, though unavailable to the litigants,
may be the crux of the dispute. In J. I. Case Co. v. Borah,113 involving
the judicial remedies of a stockholder allegedly victimized by mis-
leading proxy statements, the Solicitor General informed the Court
of the methods and problems of the Securities Exchange Commission
157. 380 U.S. 451 (1965).
158. 376 US. 369 (1964).
159. 381 US. 311 (1965).
160. The Solicitor General maintained that the same policy that tolls the statute of
limitations while an antitrust action in Federal courts was pending should govern,
allowing the private suitor to wait and take advantage of the evidence discovered by the
government, SG's Amicus Brief, 8-10.
161. 389 US. 235 (1967).
162. The Solicitor General argued that the state action seriously impeded freedom of
access to the Board, subverting the policy of the National Labor Relations Act, and could
not be justified by any state interest of compelling importance. SG's Memo 12. See also,
e.g., Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, 391 US. 392 (1968) (con-
struction of federal treaty with Indians); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the NLRB over arbitrary and discriminatory conduct by unions
towards individual employees was at issue); Snapp v. Neal, 382 U.S. 397 (1966) (Inter-
pretation of federal exemption to servicemen from state property tax); Calhoon v. Harvey,
379 U.S. 134 (1964) (power of Secretary of Labor to protect rights of employees under
the Labor Management Relations Act); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (the
Solicitor General voiced the antitrust considerations involved in a suit by a patent owner
against a licensee).
163. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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in processing proxy statements.104 In Zschernig v. Miller,'6 the appel-
lant's main argument was that an Oregon escheat statute interfered
with the foreign relations and foreign policy of the United States,'"
but the Solicitor General informed the Court that the Department of
State considered such escheat statutes of little effect on foreign rela-
tions. 167
Amicus participation is valued for the expertise and resources the
government can bring to bear on a problem and the greater likeli-
hood of its taking a more impartial view. The necessity for government
participation is most apparent where the optimal resolution of the
legal issues at stake would benefit none of the litigants in the case and
therefore may never be presented to the Court. In Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc.,'6 8 a copyright infringement action, the
future viability of CATV and local broadcasting stations was at stake,
involving complex considerations of federal communications and
antitrust policy. The Solicitor General presented the Court with a
"compromise" solution unfavorable to either of the litigants. He also
asked the Court to "stay its hand", because definitive resolution of the
matter was not possible in judicial proceedings which might delay and
prejudice an ultimate legislative solution.
16 9
C. Dealing with the Independent Agencies
Participation as amicus also gives the Solicitor General flexibility in
litigation strategy. Thus, where an independent agency is the respon-
dent, but the Solicitor General supports all or part of the petitioner's
position, allowing the agency to represent itself while participating
164. SG's Amicus Brief 12.
165. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
166. And that its enforcement "must be a source of the deepest embarrassment to the
State Department and add gravely to its conduct of the relations with [involved] coun-
tries." Jurisdictional Statement of Appellants 17.
167. SG's femo 5. See also, e.g., Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365 (19653) (the
Solicitor General informed the Court as to the position and problems of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs in protecting lease rights of Indians); King v. Smith, 88 S. CL. 842, 19
L. Ed. 971 (1968) (Justice Black asked the Solicitor General to inform him as to the inter-
pretation that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare would give to a
congressional amendment freezing certain welfare payments); Radio Union v. Broadcast
Service, 880 U.S. 255 (1965) (the Solicitor General informed the Court of the jurisdic-
tional boundaries of the NLRB).
168. 392 U.S. 590 (1968).
169. SG's Memo 2 (December 1967). The Solicitor General at first urged the Court to
hold the case on the docket and delay argument pending legislative developments. A
month later, however, he submitted a Memo (January 1968) suggesting that although a
public performance of copyrighted works results from CATV carriage of television sig-
nals, a limited license implied in law should result in light of policy consideration. See
the comments of Justice Fortas on the Solicitor General's proposal, 592 U.S. at 404.
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himself as amicus is used occasionally to resolve such delicate situa-
tions.170 While the Solicitor General might deny an agency's request to
petition for certiorari where such disagreements arose, the position of
the agency as respondent usually entails that a perfunctory opposition
brief be filed. If he did not opt for the amicus route in cases of dis-
agreement, the Solicitor General would be forced to confess error or
to abstain from the case.
Another example of the versatility of the amicus role appears in
Atlantic Refining Company v. Public Service Commission,171 a case
dealing with the early efforts of the Federal Power Commission to
regulate the field price of natural gas. The FPC lost in the circuit
court but did not (or was not permitted to) seek certiorari. The Solici-
tor General allowed the FPC to file an amicus brief in the Supreme
Court where the contest was pursued by the other parties involved.
The Federal Power Commission urged that the lower court's deci-
sion was a damaging precedent and that if the Supreme Court affirmed,
it should do so on an alternative ground.7 2
Independent agencies, with the exception of the ICC, traditionally
may not file amicus briefs on their own. Nor does the Supreme Court
invite them to participate, except indirectly by requesting the Solicitor
General to express the views of the United States on a matter com-
mitted to an agency's jurisdiction. The Solicitor General's presentation
of interagency and interdepartmental conflicts would be facilitated,
however, by allowing an agency to make its own representation as
amicus to the Court. The necessity of obtaining the Solicitor Gen-
eral's consent may often dissuade an agency from attempting to make
its views known to the Court. 73 In light of the frequent appearances
of private parties as amici curiae, the centralization of the amicus
function does not seem necessary to avoid overburdening the Court.
D. Participating in Constitutional Litigation
The Solicitor General's frequent appearance as amicus curiae in
cases involving fundamental issues of constitutional law seems his most
170. In Purolator Products, Inc. v. FTC, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968), the Solicitor Generalauthorized the FTC to file a brief in opposition to the granting of certiorari whileparticipating himself as amicus urging a reversal of the FTC's interpretation of theRobinson-Patman Act. In Monroe Auto Equipment Co. v. FTC, 382 U.S. 1009 (1966),also a Robinson-Patman price discrimination case, the Solicitor General authorized theFTC to file a brief opposing certiorari while filing an amicus brief disagreeing with theFTC on the legal question raised but conceding that this was not an appropriate case for
review.
171. 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
172. FPC Amicus Brief 16-32.
173. See pp. 1466-67 supra.
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independent role. Although the Department of Justice and the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare have specific statutory obliga-
tions in civil rights and school desegregation, the Solicitor General's
interest antedates and extends beyond congressional efforts in these
fieldsA' 4
The Solicitor General's participation in the civil disobedience
cases175 has no statutory basis, and his activism in the reapportionment
cases' 76 is founded entirely on his belief in the wisdom of the Court's
intervention in the area. The Solicitor General's role in these cases
has hardly been limited to an impartial analysis of the arguments of
the litigants; rather, he often was a partisan advocate of a particular
constitutional argument. In the reapportionment cases, the Solicitor
General functioned as the plaintiff's chief advocate and formulated a
rationale which he has consistently presented to the Court, often ad-
vocating the extension of the one man, one vote rule beyond the
Court's willingness to go.
177
174. In SG's Amicus Memos, Green v. School Board of Va., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), Raney
v. Board of Education, 391 US. 443 (1968), and Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of
Jackson, 391 US. 450 (1968), the Solicitor General argued against the freedom of choice
plans which had been permitted by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
The Solicitor General participated in the cases leading up to Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 847 US. 483 (1954) and 349 US. 29 (1955). See, e.g., SG's Amicus Memo in Sweatt
v. Painter, 839 US. 629 (1950) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents. 339 U.S. 637
(1950). See also, e.g., SG's Amicus Briefs, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. S69 (1967); Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Boynton
v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
175. See, e.g., SG's Amicus Briefs in Griffin v. Maryland, D78 U.S. 130 (1964); Barr v.
City of Columbia, 378 US. 146 (1964); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964): Bell v.
Maryland, 378 US. 226 (1964); and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964). The
solicitor General argued in the above cases that the arrest of Negroes seeking service at
privately owned business establishments violated due process because the trespas statutes
on which the arrests were made was unconstitutionally vague; and in a 
Supplemental
Brief filed at the Court's request, 375 US. 918 (1963), he argued that the discrimination
constituted state action. In Walker v. Birmingham, 388 US. 307 (1967), the Solicitor
General argued on First Amendment grounds tat civil rights leaders could challenge
the validity of an unappealed state court injunction in a criminal contempt proceeding
for violations of that injunction.
176. See the SG's Amicus Briefs in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968);
Dusch v. Davis, 387 US. 112 (1967); Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967);
Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); and Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
177. The Solicitor General consistently argued that the one man, one vote principle
of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), be applied to all local governmental bodies
whose members are determined through the elective process. In Sailors v. Board of Edu-
cation, 387 U.S. 105 (1967), the Court rejected the Solicitor General's argument, holding
that the challenged area school board performed functions of an adminitratihe nature.
and that the members were appointed not elected. In Dusch v. Davis, 387 US. 112
(1967), the Court permitted Virginia Beach to choose its legislative body by a scheme
that included at-large voting for candidates, some of whom had to be residents of particu.
lar districts, even though the residence districts varied widely in population. The
Solicitor General maintained that not only would the voters' selectivity among candi-
dates be substantially reduced under the scheme, but that it mas a fair assumption that
those members residing in sparsely populated districts would not adequately represent
those persons living in the more populous areas. See R. DXON, JR., DrstocLAIc RZPRE-
SEN'rATION 250-260 (1968).
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The Supreme Court's frequent invitation to the Solicitor General
to participate as amicus in constitutional cases is one indication of his
useful role. 78 The Solicitor General and his staff have unparalleled
experience in constitutional litigation. Their access to and knowledge
of the government apparatus not only enable them to inform the
Court of factors unknown to private parties, but also to proffer statu-
tory grounds for a decision avoiding the constitutional issues raised.170
The Solicitor General may indicate the relationship of the case to
others pending on the docket, 8 0 or the particular infirmities or
strengths of the case for resolving constitutional or statutory issues.' 8 '
Knowing the Justices' proclivities, the Solicitor General may be able to
offer a compromise solution that can gain a majority vote of the
Court.8 2 The Supreme Court, lacking an extensive staff of its own,
often benefits from the Solicitor General's impartial and sophisticated
analysis of such constitutional cases.
The threat that the Solicitor General's participation in such cases
might run contrary to the more partisan interests of the government
has occasionally been raised-"The King's champion [would] raise his
lance against the King." One recent Solicitor General voiced particular
concern about the possibility of such a conflict, and candidly admitted
178. See, e.g., Orders of the Supreme Court inviting the Solicitor General to file abrief: Oct. 14, 1968, 393 U.S. 813, in Snell v. Wyman, 393 U.S. 323 (1969) (the constitution-ality of state welfare regulations regarding recovery of welfare benefits from recipients);
Dec. 4, 1967, 389 U.S. 966, in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (con-stitutionality of Virginia voting provisions for illiterates); Nov. 18, 1963, 375 U.S. 918, inGriffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964) (whether discrimination in sit-in cases wasstate action); March 18, 1963, 372 U.S. 940, in Fields v. Fairfield, 375 U.S. 248 (1963)(whether one may test by disobedience the validity of an injunction issued by a court
of competent jurisdiction).
179. See, e.g., SG's Amicus Memo, Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544(1969) (the Solicitor General in response to the Court's invitation suggested that theequal protection argument of appellants need not be reached since the Virginia voting
test under challenge violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965); SG's Amicus Brief, Fieldsv. City of Fairfield, 375 U.S. 248 (1963) (the Solicitor General suggested that the Court
need not reach the constitutional question of whether one may test by disobedience thevalidity of an injunction issued by a court of competent jurisdiction since petitioners hadnever violated the injunction); SG's Amicus Brief, Head v. New Mexico Board of
Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963) (the Solicitor General argued that the Federal Communi-cations Act preempted the state from enjoining broadcasting deemed contrary to the
public interests, and thus avoided the commerce clause claims of appellants).
180. See, e.g., SG's Arnicus Brief 12-13, Snell v. Wyman, 393 US. 323 (1969); SG's
Amicus Brief 3, Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
181. See, e.g., SG's Amicus Memo, Continental Casualty Co. v. Robertson Lumber Co.,394 U.S. 714 (1969) where the Solicitor General suggested that although the case was
erroneously decided below the federal question raised did not have prospective Im-portance; SG's Amicus Brief, Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 US. 808 (1966), where the inter-pretation of the federal removal statute was at issue; SG's Amicus Brief, Monroe AutoEquipment Co. v. FTC, 382 US. 1009 (1966), where the Solicitor General, though dis.
agreeing with the FTC on the legal issue involved, felt there was not sufficient Informa-
tion in the record to warrant review.
182. See R. DIXON, JR., DFaiocRaTxc REPRESENTATION 257 (1968).
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his uncertainty over its resolution. The general absence of executive
interference in the Solicitor General's determination of his position on
these constitutional issues decreases the risk of such conflicts. Al-
though the Attorney General often is actively involved in these cases,18
3
unusual deference is afforded the Solicitor General and his staff.
The conflicting loyalties of the Solicitor General are not, however,
solely a function of his appearance as amicus in constitutional cases.
The most celebrated recent case where the Solicitor General's integrity
and his loyalty to the Court resulted in his refusal to defend the
government was not an amicus case.
184 The Solicitor General's need for
a degree of independence is not based on the formal label attached to
his representation in a case, but the role necessitated by prolonged
exposure to and regular participation before the Supreme Court.
183. Attorney General Ramsey Clark argued Jones v. Mayer, 392 US. 409 (1968) in
the Supreme Court. Attorney General Katzenbach argued South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966), and joined with Solicitor General Marshall on brief in Harper 
v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
184. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955). The Solicitor General refused to defend
the action of the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission in suspending
petitioner from federal employment. For somewhat differing interpretations of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Peters, compare Solicitor General Sobeofrs reading uith that
of then Assistant Attorney General-now Chief Justice-Warren Burger, who argued the
Government's position, in 1955 Arr'Y GEN,;. ANN. REP. 16, 221. See Lewis, Our Extraordinary
Solicitor-General, THE REPoRTER, May 5, 1955, at 27; Rauh, Nonconfrontation in Security
Cases: The Greene Decision, 45 VA. L. REv. 1175, 1178 (1960).
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